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UNDERPRODUCTIVE

TRUST PROPERTY

(2) In the event of a termination or initiation of a trust, or the termination of a beneficial
income interest of a trust, for a period of less than 12 months, the amount to be paid to the
income beneficiary shall be prorated proportionately with the length of the time of his interest in the trust and in accordance with section 758.03.
(3) (a) Any property which is determined to be underproductive property as defined in subsection (I) shall be disposed of by the trustee acting prudently in accordance with
section 518.11 and section 737.302.
(b) Upon the sale or exchange of the property the income beneficiary shall not be entitled
to any portion of the proceeds, except that any amount determined in subsection (1)
that remains unpaid at the time of sale shall be paid therefrom.
(4) If by the terms of the trust any portion of the income is to be retained by the trustee or
disposed of other than by payment to an income beneficiary, such portion of the amount
determined in subsection (1) shall be retained or disposed of as provided by the terms of the
trust.

THE CITADEL FOR THE HUMAN CADAVER:
THE HARVARD BRAIN DEATH CRITERIA EXHUMED
INTRODUCTION

Scientific advances in diagnosing death, have led American legal commentators to conclude the cardiac-pulmonary or common law death standard 2
cannot accurately determine the time of death for comatose patients connected

to artificial support systems 3 No longer satisfied that the cardiac-pulmonary

I. This note focuses on social and spiritual death as opposed to vegetative and metabolic
death. Social death connotes the absence of freedom, contacts and mobility. Spiritual death
reflects the inability to understand or remember and an emptiness of mind. From a medical

and legal standpoint, the declaration of spiritual death presumes irreversibility. As for vegetative and metabolic deaths, the latter signifies a disintegration of cells and tissue while the
former reffects that state where basic life processes can no longer be maintained despite artificial support.
Nothing in the biological scheme dictates that one death must precede another. Although
death is viewed as a continuing process rather than a fixed event, metabolic death may possibly precede spiritual death in certain regions of the body. Biorck, On the Definitions of Death,
14 Woax.D M. J. 137, 159-40 (1967); Biorck, The Moment of Death, 14 WORLD MED. J. 113,
134-35 (1967). This breakdown of death is by no means controlling. See Capron & Kass, A
Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a
Proposal,121 U. PENN. L. REv. 87-118 (1972); van Till, Legal Aspects of the Definition and
Diagnosis of Death, 24 HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL NFURoLOGy 787, 788-89 (1976). See also Symposium, Brain Death:InterrelatedMedical and Social Issues, 315 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sci. (1978)
[hereinafter cited as BrainDeath].
2. The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total stoppage of
the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent
thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc. BIAca's LAw D aroNARY 488 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
3. Outside the artificial support context, the common law death standard withstands
scrutiny. See notes 69-80 and accompanying text, infra. Within the artificial support context,
however, the possibility of indefinitely maintaining heart-lung activity renders suspect a death
definition based on the absence of that activity. Without an immortality exception, the application of the common law standard must be narrowed.
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standard reflects contemporary knowledge in the medical community, the legal
profession overwhelmingly supports4 acceptance of brain death as a concept5
and as a standard. 6 Used synonymously with the diagnosis of an irretrievable
4. Capron & Kass, supra note 1, at 111-18; Friloux, Death, When Does It Occur?, 27 BAYLOR
L. REv. 10 (1975); Kushnir, Bridging the Gap: The Discrepancy Between the Medical and Legal
Definitions of Death, 34 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 199 (1976); Comment, The Criteria for
Determining Death in Vital Organ Transplants- A Medico-Legal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REV.
220 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Medico-Legal Dilemma]; Comment, Medical and
Legal Views of Death: Confrontation and Reconciliation, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 172 (1974).
5. Brain death as a concept is premised on the belief that death occurs when the brain
can no longer function. Legal and medical commentators express this concept in a variety of
ways. E.g., Kaufer & Bucheler, Hirntod und Organtransplantation,in W. Krosl & E. Scherzer,

eds: DIE

BESTIMMUNG DES TODSZE5TPUNKTES

77-80 (1973) cited in van Till, supra note 1, at 788

(the irreversible loss of all functions of the brain); Korein, On Cerebral, Brain and Systemic
Death, 8 J. AM. HEART ASS'N 9 (1973) (destruction of the entire cerebrum, cerebellum and
brain stem); van Till, supra note 1, at 789 (total and irreversible cessation of all brain neuron
function).
In Issacs, Death, Where Is Thy Distinguishing?8 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 5 (1978), the possibility is raised of introducing the "personhood death concept." Underlying this notion is the
belief held by most medical scientists that only the cerebrum, the higher brain function, controls those qualities associated with personhood, i.e., consciousness, awareness, memory,
human emotion and anticipation. The logical corrollary follows that irreversible loss of
cerebral activity should be equated to brain death. Id. at 8-9. See Veatch, The Definition of
Death: Ethical,Philosophicaland Policy Confusion in Brain Death, in Brain Death, supra note
1, at 307-12. Veatch ascribes the "irreversible loss of consciousness" definition of death to those
believing cortical death equals brain death. Id. at 312. He also examines three other conceptual definitions of death: the irreversible loss of the soul, irreversible stopping of the flow
of "vital" bodily fluids, and the irreversible loss of bodily integration. For discussion of irreversible loss of the soul, see note 12 infra.
Focusing on the capacity to integrate bodily functions eliminates the possibility of making
quality of life determinations under the guise of death declarations. Whether the same claim
can be made with a focus on consciousness is uncertain. Veatch notes some critics maintain
that consciousness cannot be divorced from social interaction. Without one, the other is
illusory. Accepting this premise compels a quality of life analysis. See P. RAMSEY, ETriCS AT
TE
EDGES OF Lim (1978). Ramsey examined the Saikewicz case in a quality of life context. In
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 4 Mass. Adv. 2461, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977), The Massachusetts supreme court ruled that "life-prolonging" treatment could be
withheld from a severely retarded leukemia patient incapable of making his own decision.
Suffering from a terminal form of cancer, the patient, who was 63 years old, institutionalized,
and had the mental capacity of a three year-old, was denied chemotherapy treatment. Such
treatment was shown to arrest that type of illness for 2-13 months in 40-50% of the cases.
Ramsey contended a different outcome could have resulted had the court been confronted
with a different quality of life. "The patient, obviously, was not competent to refuse treatment. If the patient had been a normal three-year-old there is no doubt that the substituted
judgment of family, physician, or court's guardian would have favored sustaining life and he
would have been treated." Ramsey, supra, at 300.
6. Here lies the "brain" of the controversy. Medical scientists have been unable to agree
on a common set of brain death criteria to comprise a brain death standard. In 1968, the
Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death
published the first set of brain death criteria. Commonly known as the Harvard criteria, its
publication began an ongoing search for those criteria which reveal with absolute certainty,
the irreversible loss of all neurological activity. The continuing lack of consensus betrays the
unsuccessfulness of the search. See notes 37-41 and accompanying text, infra, for a detailed
discussion of the original Harvard criteria.
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loss of neurological function. or an irreversible coma," brain death as, a
0
phenomenon has far-reaching socioeconomic, 9 political, ethical," and meta7. See STEDmAN's MEDICAL DICriONARY 362 (4th Unabridged Law. ed. 1977) and note 5
supra.
8. The condition of Karen Ann Quinlan may prompt medical and legal authorities to
discontinue interchanging use of the term "irreversible coma" with brain death. Quinlan has
always maintained detectable brain activity, thereby raising the issue of euthanasia-mercy
killing, but not brain death. However, her continued life raises the unnerving possibility of
one existing in a state of irreversible coma without brain death. For four years, no artificial
support has been maintained. See In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). See, e.g.,
Doctor Succumbs After 8 years in Coma, THE Timas Sept. 23, 1969, at 2, col. 3.
9. Costs of medical care continue to skyrocket. See SuacoMmtIE ON HEALTH OF THE
CommrrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE
RESOURCE BOOK 89-92 (1976). Establishing an Intensive Care Unit with the proper resuscitative
equipment requires a minimum investment of $500,000. MARQuIs ACAnEMic MEDIA STANDARD
MEDICAL ALMANAC 280 (1977). Maintaining patients on artificial respirators in' Intensive Card
Units costs between $750-$900 a day. Many neurosurgeons consider angiography the most
advanced brain death criteria, with costs estimated at $250 for each test. Interview with Dr.

Mel Greer, Chairman, Department of Neurology at University of Florida Medical Center
IMAGE AND THE REALTY: A CASE(1978). The authors apply a broad cost/
benefit analysis to determine whether continued development of computed tomographic
scanning (CT) is desirable. Although conceding that CT, in which radiological and computer
techniques are combined to produce cross-sectional pictures of the head and body, can be
regarded as the major breakthrough in radiology since the discovery of x-rays, the authors'
enthusiasm is tempered by economics. The average charge for one scan is $295, and they
warn that "[ilt is not difficult to foresee that some technology in the future will be so costly
in relation to benefits that society will be forced to renounce them." Id. at 17.
Educating patients and families as to the meaning of brain death presents an equally imposing difficulty. Explaining the brain death concept to a decedent's family while reassurring
them that the warm body only belies brain death reveals the enormity of the problem.
Notions of death must undergo a radical rethinking. See also Wassermann, Problematical
Aspects of the Phenomenon of Death, 14 WoRLD MED. J. 146 (1967).
10. The problem of who is to decide on which brain death criteria to use underlies the
fundamental political question. Should the decision be made strictly by physicians, by a
committee comprised of physicians, lawyers and theologians, or by legislatures or courts? See
Capron & Kass, supra note 1, at 95-116; Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 COL. L. REV. 620,
633 (1969). The spectre of a government bureaucrat issuing death orders also becomes an
ever-increasing possibility. In In re Dinnerstein,78 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 959, 380 N.E.2d 134
(Mass. App. Ct. 1978), the Massachusetts appellate court decided to approve the xemoval of a
terminally ill comatose patient from artificial support even though clearly not brain dead. The
court thought it significant to footnote that a bureaucrat decided to terminate the patient's
medicare assistance because he thought the care was "essentially custodial rather than
oriented to treatment." Id. at 135 n.1.
11. Much of the ethical discussion xegarding brain death began after a presentation by
Pope Pius XII to a group of anesthesiologists in 1957. Addressing the question of the life!
death demarcation line, the Pope said: "Human life continues for as long as its vital functions, distinguished from the single life, manifest themselves without or even with the, help
of artificial processes." The Pope continued by suggesting that when the situation is hopeless,
extraordinary measures need not be used. Neither hopeless nor extraordinary were defined.
Pope Pius XII; Prolongation of Life, 4 AM. Q. PAPAL DOCTRINE 393 (1958). The ordinary/
extraordinary dichotomy and the term "hopeless" have sparked a major theological debate.
Richard McCormick, an eminent theologian has interpreted Pope Pius XII's statement to
endorse an appraisal of the quality of life; absent a "potential to human relationship", death

(April 14, 1979). See also B.
STUDY
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physical implications.12
Under the brain death standard, the possibility of declaring a live patient
dead has received little attention. Equally ignored have been European warnings that the brain death criteria used in Anglo-American countries is inadequate.13 Several West European countries have adopted measures requiring
physicians to follow specific procedures before declaring a patient brain dead. 4
Opposed to the idea of legislating specific criteria to be used by physicians in
diagnosing brain death, American legal and medical commentators have
staunchly defended the medical prerogatives in choosing criteria comprising a
brain death standard. Therefore, in proposing brain death statutes, these commentators have sought statutory recognition of the brain death concept alone.
This has left the physician free to select his own brain death criteria, regulated
only by ordinary standards of medical practice.16
Moreover, the uncertainty and confusion surrounding brain death has
created additional concerns. States have been forced to confront the need to
shield physicians from undesirable lawsuits arising from the discrepancy behas occurred. McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, 229 J. AM.
MED. A. 172-76 (1974); P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE 170-75 (1978). But cf. Connory,
The Quinlan Case, 43 LINACRE QUARTERLY 25-28 (1976) (the author contends that the Pope's remarks imply nothing more than the conventional ordinary/extraordinary distinction). These
ethical considerations extend beyond the euthanasia realm when viewed in light of the uncertainty of the brain death criteria used in America. That uncertainty creates a circle in a
yen diagram where euthanasia and brain death overlap. If society were prepared to accept
the McCormick view of death, then the brain death criteria would need to reflect no greater
accuracy than the failure to demonstrate "potential to human relationship." However, since
society has not evinced a willingness to embrace that expansive view of death, the brain death
criteria should reflect the greatest possible accuracy.
12. Medical science can neither detect the existence of the soul nor its location. The
assumption that if the soul exists it does so in the brain provides for the metaphysical foundation for acceptance of brain death as a concept. See Veatch, supra note 5, at 307. See generally
R. DESCARTES, The Passions of the Soul in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WoRus OF DESCARTES 345 (1911).
13. There have been few law review articles written by American legal commentators
which fully explore the uncertainty question. Capron and Kass devote one footnote to examining this possibility and the potential inadequacy of the Harvard criteria. Capron & Kass,
supra note I, at 90 n.14. Most articles assume the adequacy of the brain death criteria used
in America.
14. The regulations in Norway mandate a specific procedure to be followed prior to a
pronouncement of brain death. If cardiac-pulmonary functions are artificially maintained, the
following six criteria must be fulfilled: (1) the presence of known intracranial disease, which
will compromise the intracranial circulation; (2) total unconsciousness; (3) arrest of spontaneous respiration; (4) absence of cephalic reflexes; (5) cessation of all electrical activity in
the brain; and (6) cessation of all blood supply to the brain as demonstrated by four-vessel
craniocerebral angiography. Veatch, supra note 5, at 319.
15. All but a few legal commentators have agreed that the criteria used for diagnosing
brain death should remain a strictly medical matter. See Capron & Kass, supra note 1, at 92104; Friloux, supra note 4, at 17-19; Compton, Telling the Time of Human Death by Statute:
An Essential and Progressive Trend, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 521-43 (1974); Wasmuth, The
Medical,Legal and Ethical Considerationsof Human Organ Transplantation,11 WM. & MARY
L. RFv. 636, 652 (1970).
16. The California Brain Death Statute phrases the broad standard in a slightly different
manner -usual and customary procedures. These statutes provide no other guidance as to
which brain death criteria are acceptable. See notes 129-149 and accompanying text, infra.
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tween the medical and legal definitions of death,17 to coordinate brain death
criteria and effective kidney transplants, s and modernize death-related aspects
of the law. 9 While these concerns must be addressed, it may be that only a
brain death statute incorporating both the brain death concept and the most
accurate brain death criteria can properly balance the interests of patients,
physicians and society.
In recognition of the continuing problems engendered by brain death, this
note will examine the brain death criteria presently accepted and applied in
the United States. The American criteria will be compared to those used
throughout Europe. In addition, a statute will be proposed which attempts to
resolve the current controversy surrounding brain death. The proposal initially
sets forth the specific criteria to be used in diagnosing brain death and concludes with a provision allowing potential comatose patients to consent to a
death declaration based on brain death criteria presently used in America.
MEDICAL INDICES FOR DETERMINING DEATH

Cardiac-PulmonaryStandard
Recent scientific breakthroughs have enabled prolongation of pulmonary
and circulatory functioning beyond detectable neurological activity.20 His17. States which have not passed brain death statutes should theoretically rely on the
traditional common law definition of death. Physicians, however, are applying brain death
criteria. Major medical centers have not waited for their state legislatures to enact brain death
legislation before adopting brain death criteria.
Both Harvard University and the University of Pittsburgh have approved brain death
criteria without the passage of brain death statutes in their respective states.
18. Surgeons are convinced that the quality of the transplanted kidney is a function of
the time the kidney remains without blood circulation. Continuing artificial support after
declaring one brain dead narrows the time gap substantially. In the context of the Harvard
criteria, the kidney is only without blood circulation as long as necessary for the surgeon to
insert the organ into the donee's body. Reference is made to kidney transplants rather than
organ transplants generally, because kidneys are the only organs presently transplanted where
continuous circulation is critical. Interview with Dr. Mel Greer, Chairman, Department of
Neurology at University of Florida Medical Center (April 4, 1979).
19. A discussion of every aspect of the law affected by death is beyond the scope of this
note. A number of these aspects not treated elsewhere in this paper shall be considered here.
Life insurance policies have often included a condition precedent to recovery revolving
around the actual time of the victim's death. In Douglas v. Southern Life Ins. Co., 374
S.W.2d 788, 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), the condition precedent required death within 90 days
of the victim's accident. The prolongation of life for 120 days as defined by the cardiacpulmonary standard precluded recovery.
In the law of estates, a time must be fixed for the taking of property by a joint-tenant and
vesting of a contingent remainder. See D.W. Elliot, When is the Moment of Death?, 4 MEnICINE, ScIENcE AND THE LAW 77, 78 (1964). And in agency law, it is necessary to know when
the agent can no longer be acting on behalf of the undisclosed principal because of the
latter's death. See CoNARD, KNAuss & SIEGEL, ENTERPMSE ORGANIZATION 273 (2d ed. 1977).
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in modernizing the law arises from the demands of the Iav to
fix death at a moment in time. As Viscount Simon observed in Hickman v. Peacey, A.C. 304,
317 (1945) (Viscount Simon, L.D., dissenting), "Death, I suppose, may be a process rather
than an instantaneous event . . ." See Skegg, Irreversibly Comatose Individuals: "Alive" or
"Dead'?,33 CaimRIDGE L.J. 130 (1974).
20. The two most noted inventions include the cardiac pacemaker and ventilating equip-
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torically, the existence of brain activity did not influence the medical definition
of death. While recognizing the equally vital role of the neurological function,
the medical profession had not formulated criteria for establishing such cessation. As science had not developed the technology to artificially maintain the
circulatory-pulmonary functions, physicians presumed that total brain damage
occurred shortly after heart-lung activity ceased.23 Thus, the criteria for the
classical definition of death had been met - "the cessation of all vital functions
22
of the human body."
Diagnosing death by determining when the heartbeat and respiration ceased
did not guarantee death had occurred.23 Throughout the 19th and early 20th
centuries, journalists reported incidents where apparently dead bodies had been
interred due to a medical diagnosis of death. Only later, usually due to mystical
premonitions, were the bodies exhumed. On several occasions, evidence indicated that the supposedly dead corpse had been alive subsequent to burial.24
These premature burials caused the public to be suspicious of death pronouncements. Within the last twenty years there have been reported incidents of incorrect diagnoses based on the cardiac-pulmonary death standard which resulted in premature declarations of death. 25 Although some consider these
medical errors mere flukes, 26 a diagnosis of death only approximates that life
ment. Although these devices continue to be refined, much of their development has taken
place within the last 30 years. The ventilating equipment can fulfill the respiratory needs of
the patient and the cardiac pacemaker can continue the circulatory functions. H. STEPHENSON,
JR., CARDIAC ARREST & RESUSCITATION 443-45 (4th ed. 1974); J. YOUNG & D. CROCKER, PRINCIPLES
AND PRACrICE OF RESPIRATORY THERAPY 453-62 (2d ed. 1976).
21. Most medical scientists believe that brain neurons, the source of perception, will
irreversibly atrophy in the absence of oxygen circulation in the brain for a period of 10-15
minutes. Smith & Walker, Cerebral Blood Flow and Brain Metabolism as Indicators of
Cerebral Death, 133 JOHNS HOPKINS MED. J. 107, 110 (1973). See also Kimura, The Isoelectric
Electroencephalogram,121 ARCH. INTERN. MD. 511-17 (1968).
22. Comment, Medico-Legal Dilemma, supra note 4, at 221. The views of science appeared
to be only an extension of the generally held belief that the heart was the center of activity;
when the heart stopped, life stopped. The myriad colloquials emphasizing the heart as the
focus of passionate emotions reflects these deeply rooted sentiments. See Veatch, supra note 5,
at 310.
23. The absence of a foolproof cardiac-pulmonary death diagnosis has received much
attention. Between 1700 and 1900, several hundred pamphlets were written criticizing clinical
techniques used to observe the cessation of heartbeat and respiration. Moreover, the literature
informing doctors of the proper procedures in diagnosing death were amazingly scarce. Only
one medical publication by 1925 could be found distinguishing dissembling signs from signals
evincing an irreversible cessation of these vital functions. Arnold, et al., Public Attitudes and
the Diagnosis of Death 206 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1949, 1949-54 (1968).
24. Buried Alive, 1877 BRIT. MED. J. 819 (movement in the coffin, body shifted, hair
pulled out, clothes ripped and other ghastly sights).
25. In one case, a soldier was declared dead by a team of physicians. The physicians unsuccessfully tried to revive the soldier through various resuscitation techniques for 45 minutes.
Several hours later, an army embalmer noticed signs of life. The soldier was returned to the
hospital and after three months made a limited recovery. Arnold, supra note 23, at 1952.
26. UNIvEsrry HEALTH LAW CENTER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 55 (2d ed. 1974). One
physician reportedly found reassurance in the lack of publicity of earlier cases of premature
death. He believed such publicity would only confuse the public and result in unwarranted
questioning of the brain death criteria. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol32/iss2/4

6

Rothstein: The Citadel for the Human Cadaver: The Harvard Brain Death Criter

1980]

HARVARD BRAIN DEATH CRITERIA

has ceased27 Therefore, in comparing the brain death criteria reliability to,
traditional criteria, neither method may be considered foolproof; only the
relative degree of reliability may be examined.
Brain Death - Concept and Standard

With the advent of cardiac pacemakers and ventilators,2 1 the absence of
heartbeat and spontaneous respiration became questionable indices of death.
As artificial support prolonged the circulatory and pulmonary functions indefinitely, 29 an individual could theoretically sustain an irretrievable loss of
neurological function while simultaneously having heartbeat and respiration
maintained. Therefore, a patient could be brain dead, but considered alive
according to the common law standard which did not distinguish artificial from
spontaneous cardiac-pulmonary function.30 No longer could death be viewed as
one integrated event.
Scientists previously conceptualized death as a gradual, continuing process
with cessation of the vital functions soon followed by death at the molecular
level.31 However, the advent of artificial support permitted the anomalous coexistence of life and death processes in one human organism.3 2 The possibility
of an organism composed of a dead brain and a smoothly functioning cardiacpulmonary system compelled physicians to focus more closely on neurological
27. See van Till, supra note 1, at 789, 798. van Till traced the changes in the definition of
death as monitored in the medical dictionaries as a result of attempts to synthesize these two
concepts. Thus, in 1948, DoRLAN.'S AMERICAN ILLUSTRATED MEICAL DIcrboNARY defined death
as "cessation or extinction of life." In 1965, the definition became "the apparent extinction of
life, as manifested by absence of heartbeat and respiration." Finally, in 1974, the latest revision was adopted: "The cessation of life; permanent cessation of all vital bodily functions ....
See van Till, supra note 1, at 789. With the present state of medical knowledge, it
is not possible to pinpoint exactly when a "permanent cessation of all vital bodily functions"
has occurred. See notes I & 19 supra.
28. See note 20 supra.
29. Even with artificial support, some maintain that circulatory function cannot be
sustained longer than two weeks. F. PLUM & J. POSNER, DIAGNOSIS OF SUPOR AND COMA 226 (2d
ed. 1972). Cf. Rubin, et al., Cerebral Death, 75 J. MED. Soc. N.J. 825-28 (1978), where Dr.
Rubin discusses the distinction between brain death and euthanasia. In the Quinlan case,
artificial support has sustained the circulatory and pulmonary function because definite
cerebral activity has been present. Only when cerebral activity has ceased will the other vital
functions artificially supported terminate within a few weeks.
30. The traditional standard conditions existence only on the continuous functioning of
heart/lung activity. Whether maintenance depends upon artificial support is immaterial. See
note 2 supra.
81. See, e.g., D. W. MYvms, THE HuMAN BODY AND THE LAw: A MEDIco-LEGAL STUDY 115
(1970). Cf. Wasmuth, The Concept of Death, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 82, 38 (1959) (drawing the
distinction between somatic death, the immediate death of the individual, and cellular death,
the deterioration of body tissue).
82. Muller, Legal Medicine - The Delimitation of Death, 14 WoRrD MEn. J. 140 (1967).
Muller stresses that death is a continuing process, and cites instances where life and death
coexisted in human subjects prior to artificial support mechanisms. Evidence of living tissue
in dead subjects usually could be found in those who suffered sudden deaths. However, the
basic life processes - cardiopulmonary functions - have been maintained in the absence of the
third basic life process -neurological activity-only since the development of advanced
resuscitative techniques. Id. See also Biorck, supra note 1, at 138.
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activity. It was soon established that total brain damage conclusively presumed
the individual to have sustained an irreversible loss of perception due to the
33
brain's lack of curative powers.
Authorities disagree as to when an irretrievable loss of neurological function
exists. One school of thought contends brain death has occurred when the brain
can no longer maintain spontaneous respiration and/or cardio-vascular function.3 4 Another group theorizes that only the absence of all neuronal functions
in all parts of the brain indicates brain death. 35 Further controversy exists on
whether the criteria currently used in the United States conclusively establish
an individual's death. The medical community's inability to reach a consensus
on this critical point has stirred world-wide debate on whether American brain
death criteria are accurate indices signaling the occurrence of death.3 6
American Criteria
During the late 1960s, a group of eminent scholars- 7 published a set of
33. F. PLUM & J. POSNER, supra note 29, at 227-28. These physicians contend that lack of
oxygen to the brain for two minutes could damage the central nervous system. However, they
note "[i]t is harder to determine how much anoxia is required to produce total irreversible
injury of the brain and exactly how anoxia produces its damage." Id. at 227. Some studies
reported evidence of neurological activity after 30-60 minutes of anoxia. Id. at 228; see also
Hossman & Olsson, Suppression and Recovery of Neuronal Function in Transient Cerebral
Ischemia, 22 BRAIN Rzs. 313-25 (1970).
34. Cerebral death is the term often used to describe the absence of spontaneous cardiopulmonary function, or an inability for internal homeostasis. F. PLUM & J. POSNE.R, supra note
29, at 224. See also note 5 supra.
35. See note 49 infra.
36. See Cranford, Brain Death: Concept and Criteria, 61 MINN. MED. 600-03 (1978);
Goodman & Aung, CerebralDeath: Theological, Judicial & Medical Aspects 7 HEART & LUNG
477, 478-83 (1978); Olinger, supra note 4, at 22; Rubin, supra note 29, at 825-28; van Till,
supra note 1, at 787-824; Wasmuth, supra note 15, at 646-51; see generally Brain Death, supra
note 1.
37. The group of faculty members, which included ten physicians, one lawyer, one historian of science and one theologian, comprised the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard
Medical School to Examine Brain Death. They published the Harvard Report, which set
forth guidelines for the diagnosis of an irreversible coma. The committee recommended the
following criteria: "Characteristics of Irreversible Coma [Harvard Criteria]. An organ, brain
or other, that no longer functions and has no possibility of functioning again is for all
practical purposes dead. Our first problem is to determine the characteristics of a permanently
nonfunctioning brain."
"A patient in this state appears to be in deep coma. The condition can be satisfactorily
diagnozed by points 1, 2, and 3 to follow. The electroencephalogram (point 4) provides confirmatory data, and when available it should be utilized. In situations where for one reason
or another electroencephalographic monitoring is not available, the absence of cerebral
function has to be determined by purely clinical signs, to be described, or by absence of
circulation as judged by standstill of blood in the retinal vessels, or by absence of cardiac
activity.
"1. Unreceptivity and Unresponsivity.- There is total unawareness to externally applied
stimuli and inner need and complete unresponsiveness- our definition of irreversible coma.
Even the most intensely painful stimuli evoke no vocal or other response, not even a groan,
withdrawal of a limb, or quickening of respiration.
"2. No Movements or Breathing.- Observations covering a period of at least one hour by
physicians is adequate to satisfy the criteria of no spontaneous movements or spontaneous
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criteria to be used in determining if an irreversible coma (brain death) had
taken place. Commonly know as the 1968 Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard
Medical Center, the group set down four specific guidelines which would supposedly reveal whether the patient sustained an irreversible coma: First, discover if the patient responds to external stimuli;3 8 second, for at least one hour
respiration or response to stimuli such as pain, touch, sound, or light. After the patient is on
a mechanical respirator, the total absence of spontaneous breathing may be established by
turning off the respirator for three minutes and observing whether there is any effort on the
part of the subject to breathe spontaneously. (The respirator may be turned off for this time
provided that at the start of the trial period the patient's carbon dioxide tension is within
normal range, and provided also that the patient had been breathing room air for at least 10
minutes prior to the trial.
"3. No reflexes. -Irreversible coma with abolition of central nervous system activity is
evidenced in part by the absence of elicitable reflexes. The pupil will be fixed and dilated and
will not respond to a direct source of light. Since the establishment of a fixed, dilated pupil is
clear-cut in clinical practice, there should be no uncertainty as to its presence. Ocular movement (to head turning and to irrigation of the ears with ice water) and blinking are absent.
There is no evidence of postural activity (decerebrate or other). Swallowing, yawning, vocalization are in abeyance. Corneal and pharyngeal reflexes are absent.
"As a rule the stretch of tendon reflexes cannot be elicited; i.e. tapping the tendons of the
biceps, triceps, and pronator muscles, quadriceps and gastrocnemius muscles with the reflex
hammer elicits no contraction of the respective muscles. Plantar or Noxious stimulation
gives no response.
"4. Flat Electroencephalogram.- Of great confirmatory value is the flat or isoelectric EEG.
We must assume that the electrodes have been properly applied, that the apparatus is
functioning normally, and that the personnel in charge is competent. We consider it prudent
to have one channel of the apparatus used for an electrocardiogram. This channel will
monitor the ECG so that, if it appears in the electroencephalographic leads because of high
resistance, it can be readily identified. It also establishes the presence of the active heart in
the absence of the EEG. We recommend that another channel be used for a noncephalic lead.
This will pick up space-borne or vibration-borne artifacts and identify them. The simplest
form of such a monitoring noncephalic electrode has two leads over the dorsum of the hand,
preferably the right hand, so the ECG will be minimal or absent. Since one of the xequirements of this state is that there be no muscle activity, these two dorsal hand electrodes will
not be bothered by muscle artifact. The apparatus should be run at standard gains 10 uv/mm,
50 uv/Smm. Also it should be isoelectric at double this standard gain which is 5u/mm or
25 uv/5mm. At least ten full minutes of recording are desirable, but twice that would be better.
"It is also suggested that the gains at some point be opened to their full amplitude for a
brief period (5 to 100 seconds) to see what is going on. Usually in an intensive care unit artifacts will dominate the picture, but these are readily identifiable. There shall be no electroencephalographic response to noise or to pinch.
"All of the above tests shall be repeated at least 24 hours later with no change.
"The validity of such data as indications of irreversible cerebral damage depends on the
exclusion of two conditions: hypothermia (temperature below 900 F [32.2o C] or central
nervous system depressants, such as barbiturates."
Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J. AM. MED. A. 337 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
the Harvard Report].
38. The guidelines assume that even before this first step is taken, the attending physician
will have ruled out a possibility of depressants dissimulating death. Such drugs can cause the
central nervous system (CNS) to function at a level beyond detection. The same can result
from hypothermia (temperature below 900 F [52.2o C]). Whether the patient responds to
pain, touch, sound or light, will determine the results of the first procedure. Id.
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look for any spontaneous muscular movements or respiration; 39 third examine
the patient's reflexes, both natural and in response to profound pain; 40 and
fourth, solely for confirmation purposes, administer two electronencephalo41
graphic examinations (EEG) at 24 hour intervals.
Since the publication of the original Harvard criteria, medical centers across
the United States42 have reported their findings on brain death diagnosis. These
medical centers have established criteria substantially similar to Harvard's
43
initial pronouncement.
Notwithstanding that the leading American forensic experts believe the

39. If the patient is supported by artificial means, the physician can turn the respirator
off for three to four minutes. The effect should be not to kill the patient, but rather to create
an excess of carbon dioxide so as to trigger spontaneous breathing to relieve the excess. See
Goodman & Aung, supra note 36, at 478-83. Furthermore, bilateral mydriasis (fixed dilated
pupils) shouldbe diagnosed. Harvard Report, supra note 37, at 338.
40. The guidelines recommend the use of "even the most intensely painful stimuli [to
demonstrate] no vocal or other response." Id. at 338.
41. The Harvard Report recommended recording electrical activity for ten full minutes.
Id.
42. See Cranford, supra note 36, at 600-03; Goodman & Aung, supra note 36, at 478-83;
Rubin, supra note 29, at 825-28; Wecht & Aranson, Medical-Legal Ramifications of Human
Tissue Transplantation,18 DEPAUL L. REv. 488, 492-95 (1969). See also Kushnir, supra note 4,
at 204 nn.35-38. Outside of the United States, medical centers have also been searching for the
most appropriate brain death criteria. A wide-ranging survey conducted by the National Institute of Neurological Disease and Strokes (NINDS) revealed a number of differences in
brain death criteria used by medical centers worldwide. Some centers have claimed two EEG
readings thirty minutes apart can conclusively diagnose an irreversible coma, while others
still adhere to the twenty-four hour interval set down in the original Harvard Report. Disagreement has also arisen over the length dilated pupils must measure before considered a
valid clinical sign of brain death. Finally, no consensus has been reached as to the possibility
of certain reflexes coexisting with an irreversible coma, and the need to measure intracranial blood flow. See Goodman & Aung, supra note 36, at 478-83. See also note 6 supra; van
Till, supra note 1, at 800, 804-06; Comment, Medico-Legal Dilemma, supra note 4, at 228.
43. The Ad Hoc Committee on Brain Death at the University of Minnesota Medical
Center, slightly revising the Harvard findings, recently claimed that the original criteria could
be relaxed without increasing the risk of incorrect diagnosis. The committee's research indicated that certain types of reflexes could co-exist with brain death. Spinal segmental reflexes,
such as deep tendon reflexes and triple flexion responses were the reflexes specified. In addition, the group placed considerably less emphasis on the EEG. While agreeing that the EEG
should be used for confirmation purposes alone, the Minnesota group recommended that the
use of the EEG should be left to the attending physician's discretion. However, the Minnesota
Report still advised using precautionary measures to insure the patient is not intoxicated or
suffering from hypothermia.
The Minnesota Committee also recommended that only a 5mm fixed pupil dilation was
consistent with brain stem destruction. The Harvard Report had suggested a minimum 7mm
length for irreversible bilateral mydriasis.
Perhaps the most important difference urged by the Minnesota Committee was that the
observation period be shortened to 12 hours, half the time originally proposed by the Harvard
Committee. Consistent with findings at other American medical centers, the Minnesota Committee reduced the variables necessary for an accurate pronouncement of brain death. Cranford, supra note 36, at 600-03. Moreover, studies to be released within the next few years will
claim that the absence of electrical activity within a specific portion of the brain will be
indicative of an irreversible coma. See Issacs, supra note 5, at 5.
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brain death criteria to be unquestionably sound,44 extensive criticism has been
steadily building in Europe. Concluding the margin of error is beyond acceptable limits, many European medical and legal experts45 have rejected the
44. "Patients meeting the . .. Harvard [brain death] criteria will not recover and on
autopsy will be found to have brains which are obviously destroyed." Capron & Kass, supra
note 1, at 90. See, e.g., Olinger, supra note 7, at 23-25.
45. The critiques have been launched throughout Western Europe. See Rot & van Till,
NeocorticalDeath After CardiacArrest, 2 LANcEr 1099-1100 (1971) (letter to the editor). See
also Jorgenson, et al., Brain Death Pathogenesis and Diagnosis, 49 AcrA NEURaoL. SCAxNINAV.

305 (1973) as cited in van Till, supra note 1, at 804; note 14 supra; NErmRLANDS RED CROSS
SocIEry, SuMMARY OF THE RFPORT OF THE AD Hoc CoMMrrrEE ON ORGANTRANSPLANTATION 11-13
(1971).
The Netherlands Red Cross Society published a report issuing guidelines and criteria for an
accurate diagnosis of brain death. The inclusion of a mandatory angiography perhaps highlights the difference with the Harvard Criteria.
"Netherlands Red Cross Criteria.
I. Definition. Braindeath is the total and irreversible absence of brainfunction; or, in
other words, the irreversible loss of all brainfunction, inclusive the function of the brain-

stem.
I. Diagnosis. Braindeath in unconscious patients whose blood circulation and ventilation
are artificially maintained (i.e. patients under resuscitation treatment, patients on a heartlung machine and anaesthesized patients) must be diagnosed by a team, consisting of a

clinical neurologist (c.q. neurosurgeon), a qualified EEG specialist, and a (neuro-)
anaesthesist or resuscitation specialist. The diagnosis of braindeath is based on the simultaneous presence of the following symptoms:
1 - The patient is deeply unconscious.
2 - Both pupils are dilated and unresponsive to light.
3-There is no spontaneous breathing; when artificial ventilation is discontinued, the

patient does not spontaneously resume breathing.
4- On neurological examination there is a complete cerebral or total areflexia.
N.B.: One should strictly distinguish between
4-1: Cerebral Reflexes: - no reaction to pain-stimuli
- a negative Aschner reflex
- no corneal reflex, corneal-mandibular reflex, pharynx reflex, cough reflex
- no compensatory movements of the eyes upon passive movements of the head
Total and permanent absence of cerebral reflexes (inclusive brainstem-reflexes) is an absolute requisite for the diagnosis of braindeath.
4-2: Spinal reflexes:
- there are no tendon or cutaneous reflexes initially. Experience and recent literature
show that, after spinal shock (diaschizis) has abated, and if resuscitation is continued, the
spinal cord may sometimes assume an autonomous activity, so that some spinal reflexes may
return, [even after brain death has occurred]
5 - The tension of the skeleton muscles is at a minimum level (muscular hypotonia).
6 - [intracranial (= within the skull) blood pressure is zero, even though extracranial (=
outside the skull, i.e. in the body) pressure still exists at whatever level.]
7 - The temperature regulation of the body is impaired.
8 - The EEG is iso-electric, and unreactive to strong provocational stimuli.
One should pay attention to the following points:
8-1: an iso-electric EEG by itself is no criterion for the diagnosis of braindeath ....
III. Proof:
If any doubt remains about braindeath, for instance because one of the symptoms is

ambiguous or missing, there are several verification-techniques to confirm the presence or
absence of bloodcirculation in the brain.
Absence of cerebral bloodcirculation, at normal body temperature leads within 10 minutes.
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American based criteria. Dr. Van Till, a leading European critic, alleges the
criteria were not established for purely biological reasons. 4r Rather, she contends such criteria have been formulated for emotional, practical, socioeconomic and transplantational reasons. 47 Such European critics have been
completely dissatisfied with the United States' unquestioned reliance on the
Harvard criteria.

4

8

(as a maximum) to the death of the braincells, with the well known exceptions of intoxicated or anaesthetized patients and very young children.
N.B.: This thesis is not reversible: the presence of bloodcirculation in the brain does not
imply the presence of brainfunction or the being-alive of the patient.
These verification-techniques include:
1 - fluorescine-retinography
2 - cerebral scintigraphy
3 - carotid and vertebral angiography
4 - an EEG recording of brainstem-structures by using cerebral depth-electrodes.
IV. If the patient does not show all the symptoms of point II, 1 - 8 or does not satisfy the
verifications of point III, resuscitation should be continued with all available means.
If a certain stabilization is then reached, treatment will be continued until changes for
better or worse occur, which necessitate a reconsideration and a new decision.
Some contra-indications for resuscitation in the patient's own interest are, in our
opinion:
a. the existence of extensive braindamage which is visible to the unarmed eye, and which
ascertains a priori that the present absence of brainfunction is permanent, even if it is not
immediately total.
b. neurosurgically-demonstrated irreparable braindamage, such as a braintumor.
In both cases a serious and irreversible loss of brainfunction is certain, even if that
particular loss of function is not always immediately complete; sometimes the patient still
breathes spontaneously.
Resuscitation of these patients may make sense in the interest of others, in view of
organpreservation for transplantation. In that way one gains time to ask permission for
organremoval, selection of a recipient, etc. If these patients do receive resuscitationtreatment, the death of such patient must be diagnosed according to II, 1 - 8, before any
intervention (autopsy, organremoval) may take place.
If these patients do not receive resuscitation-treatment, their death should also be
diagnosed before any intervention may take place.
Decortication or decerebration (in the clinical sense, see appendix 2) in itself does not
equal braindeath and does not justify the use of the patient as an organdonor.
Under present conditions only the dead patient may be used as an organdonor." Id.
46. van Till, Diagnosisof Death in Comatose Patients Under Resuscitation Treatment: A
Critical Review of the Harvard Report, 2 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 16 (1976).
47. Id. at 15. van Till quotes from the Harvard Report itself to support her proposition.
See id. at 15 nn.34 & 35. The Report emphasizes the stress on the comatose patient's family,
the need for hospital beds and organ transplant considerations. As for the latter, the Harvard
Report warns of a shortage of surgeons if they face increasing risks of liability for transplanting a kidney after a declaration of brain death. Id.
48. van Till emphasizes the "far-reaching personal and social consequences" of a physician's declaration of death:
"The person declared dead loses all his former rights; To all intents and purposes he is
,outlawed', and ceases to exist as a legal subject. He is no longer protected against murder or
other forms of maltreatment. This is also true where he has been accidentally or intentionally
declared dead prematurely. In order to safeguard the citizen against premature loss of rights
(such as the right to life and to physical inviolability), whether this has happened through
ignorance, carelessness or abuse of power, lawyers, judges and legislators may and must concern themselves with the definition, the diagnosis and the proof of death. Medical theories
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European Criteria
The European perception approach undercuts the Harvard criteria by
defining death as the absence of human perception, and perception as the
simplest form of psychic activity which occurs exclusively within the confines
of the brain.4 9 Unlike the Harvard criteria, the perception approach does not
equate death with irreversible coma when an absence of spontaneous respiration exists over a specific period of time. 50 Accordingly, an irreversible coma
equals death only when it has been conclusively demonstrated that the
comatose patient has irretrievably lost the power of perception.51
Close examination of the perception approach reveals that under this theory,
the possibility exists for a comatose patient to be alive, but dead under the
Harvard criteria.52 The brain could engender sufficient electrical current to

about these subjects may be criticized by non-physicians on a basis of precision and logic,
which are the foundations of all scientific activity.
"When making a diagnosis, the fact that our knowledge is incomplete and our techniques
and apparatus are imperfect must be taken into account. Thus the absence or outwardly
perceptible signs of consciousness leads to the assumption that consciousness itself is entirely
absent, but does not prove this assumption to be correct; a comatose patient can sometimes
receive stimuli and appreciate them, although he cannot always show this. Expressions of
function must not be equated with function itself: '... no response does not prove unawareness of the stimulus.' van Till, supranote 1, at 787-88.
49. In describing the perception approach, van Till stresses that the focus must center on
existence and not on the relative degree of functioning capacity. Furthermore, whether
mental activity exists should not be decided simply by determining if such activity is perceptible to others. van Till claims that mentally defective patients, newborns and comatose patients
are generally unable to communicate outwardly, but no one assumes their internal mental
activity non-existent. Accordingly, the brain cell structures (neurons and synapses) should be
the common denominator for human life. As science cannot prove that this rudimentary brain
function does not create some (awareness) psychical activity, the contrary should be assumed,
especially since the Harvard criteria cannot conclusively reveal an absence of neurological
activity in the mid-brain or brain stem. Therefore, if doubt exists the presumption should be
life instead of death. This leads van Till to conclude, unless consented to otherwise, only the
most accurate brain death criteria should be applied. van Till, supra note 1, at 815.
50. The absence of spontaneous respiration is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
a death diagnosis. Proof of an unsustainable intracranial blood flow is also required. van Till,
supra note 46, at 16; Netherlands Red CrossSociety, supra note 45, at 12-16.
51. See note 50 supra.
52. For example, neurological activity could be too weak to cause patient response to external stimuli, but at the same time, the patient could be pain-sensitive. The theoretical
premise rests on the belief that "brain stem function may be able to produce primitive psychic
activity." German physicians are persuaded that at least younger children have such a
capacity. van Till, supra note 46, at 9. van Till also notes that postmortem procedures, according to ordinary standards of medical practice, are performed without anesthesia. Therefore, unless the diagnosis of death is based on the most accurate criteria, the patient could
risk intense suffering. Moreover, van Till believes that head transplants can no longer be
dismissed as science fiction. Heads of rhesus monkeys and eight living "cephalic preparations"
of aborted human fetuses 12-17 weeks old (gestational age) have been subjected to head
transplant surgery. These futuristic operations are unthinkable if conducted on patients not
entirely free of pain sensations. See id. at 12 n.26; White, et al., Primate Cephalic Transplantation: Neurogenic Separation, Vascular Association, 3 TRANSPLANT PRoc. 602-04 (1971),
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maintain perception, but not reflexes or muscular movements. 5 3 As the Harvard
criteria do not purport to gauge capacity for primitive perception,54 these two
approaches are not reconciliable. Not even the EEG can be expected to bridge
the gap between the Harvard criteria and the perception approach. 55
While claiming the Harvard criteria to be insufficient to detect brain
death,s6 the European critics have proposed additional tests which they believe
53. van Till agrees with the Minnesota Brain Death Committee conclusions that spinal
reflexes may exist in spite of brain death. See note 43 supra.
54. The Harvard Report concerns itself with neither the functioning of neurons, nor
efforts to assure the non-existence of any perceptive capacity. Rather, the criteria focus on the
absence of reflexes and muscular movements as determinative signs of death. See note 37 supra.
55. From the Harvard Committee's recommendation that the EEG be used for confirmation purposes only, the EEG's limitations are apparent. The EEG's inability to probe
deep in the brain without augmenting the risks of greater brain damage underlies the EEG's
limited utility.
Not only is safety compromised when probing the brain deeply with the EEG, but also
the level of psychic activity (perception) existing in the mid-brain or brain stem cannot be
determined by physicians. Thus, the possibility of brain neurons functioning in these deeper
regions of the brain exist. Since perception originates in brain neurons, the Harvard criteria
can diagnose perception, if at all, only in the cerebrum. Moreover, the Harvard Report
clouded the distinction between a malfunctioning brain and a non-functioning brain. The
former suggests the possibility of continued neurological activity at the mid-brain and brain
stem levels, van Till, supra note 46, at 19. By hypothesizing the absence of perception in the
brain stem and mid-brain, physicians are perhaps presuming more than is desirable. Thus,
the patient who fails to meet the physician's prior reasoning could be subjected to excruciating pain as the physician tests for pain "unresponsiveness - unreceptivity." Harvard Report,
supra note 37, at 337. Unable to communicate the agony, the patient could suffer intensely
during the testing. See notes 49 & 52 supra. It is also necessary to distinguish a scalp EEG
from a "depth EEG". The Harvard Report recommended using only the scalp EEG which can
detect electrical current in the cortex, the gray surface layers of the cerebral hemispheres.
Conversely, the depth EEG can provide information about the deeper structures of the brain.
However, serious harm can result from the use of a depth EEG, making it an impractical
tool in death diagnosis. Furthermore, similar to the scalp EEG, it cannot diagnose irreversibility. van Till, supra note 46, at 18 n.41. But cf. Alderete et al., Irreversible Coma: A Clinical
Electroencephalographicand Neuropathological Study, 93 TRANSAcriONS OF THE AM. NEUROLOGICAL ASS'N 16, 16-20 (1968). From studies conducted with cats, many neurosurgeons believe
that clinical signs reflect an irreversible cessation of neurological function. The studies revealed that cerebral circulation when mechanically interrupted disappeared from the cortex
much faster than from the mid-brain or brain stem. When the circulation was restored, the
process reversed itself. Recovery was most rapid in the mid-brain and brain stem and slowest
in the cortex. Assuming that the absence of reflexes and respiration denotes cessation of brain
stem and mid-brain activity, the conclusions of the study are reasonable. "When ... brainstem
show[s] no clinical activity (no respiration and no reflexes), it is most unlikely that the cortex
will recover since its differential survival and recover times are least favorable." Id. at 17.
Critics would challenge the basic premise equating a clinical diagnosis of areflexia and apnea
with the irreversible cessation of mid-brain and brain stem function. See notes 42 & 49 supra.
56. See Goodman & Aung, supra note 36, at 482. The authors reviewed a brain death
criteria study conducted by the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Strokes
(NINDS), and concluded by acquiescing in the margin of error inhering in the Harvard
criteria. "In summary, there is no current foolproof method to determine with 100 per cent
accuracy the occurrence of brain death, but the needs of society are moving in all directions
to establish and accept such standards discussed herein .... It was Shakespeare's King Lear
who best stated our plight over 400 years ago: '0, vex not his ghost: 0, let him pass! He hates
him that upon the rack of this tough world would stretch him out longer.'" Id. But see
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are the most accurate.5 7 These tests are premised on scientific evidence that an
absence of intracranial blood flow s for a period in excess of fifteen minutes
negates any possibility of life.5 9 Several methods for insuring a proper lapse of
60
time have been devised, most importantly, angiography.
Although the European school believes angiography is the most desirable
method for detecting brain death, they concede that some serious risks inhere
in the use of this test.61 American physicians admit the test's validity in accurately diagnosing brain death, but steadfastly deny the test's necessity, rejecting as "poppycock" 62 the notion that current brain death criteria are unreliable.
Arnold, supra note 23 at 1949-54. Arnold's research indicated an unwillingness on the part of
the public to capitulate. "The form and style of the public dialogue on medical ethics has
not completely taken shape, but it would appear that the dialogue will need to be candid as
well as broadly based. Expert committees and specialists may contribute to the dialogue, but
the mood of our sample population suggests that lay people of many social strata want to
know the rules, and they want to be involved in their formulation." Id. at 1954.
57. Additional tests such as angiography are recommended for use only after the Harvard
criteria have been met. van Till, supra note 46, at 21. If the hospital does not have the
facilities to perform an angiogram, there are other measures which, following the application
of the Harvard criteria, can also conclusively presume death. They include: "1) waiting at
least 15 consecutive minutes after artificial respiration has been terminated; or 2) waiting until
the extracranial blood pressure has been zero, or in any case, below the patient's shock level
or below intracranial tension, during at least 15 consecutive minutes. In both cases it is,
certain that the intracranial circulation of oxygenated blood has ceased totally during at
least 15 consecutive minutes." van Till, supra note 1, at 806.
58. Blood circulation provides the brain with oxygen and nutrients while simultaneously
eliminating waste products. van Till, supra note 46, at 21.
59. Id. at 21 n.45. The physician must still carefully dismiss possibilities of hypothermia.
CNS depressants or tender age. The test is to prove anoxia, an absence of oxygen from the
brain for a period of at least 15 minutes. Id. See note 21 supra.
60. See note 57 supra. The angiography includes injecting a patient with a radio-opaque
substance followed by an x-ray photograph. If blood vessels are visible on the angiogram, then
the intra-cranial blood flow exists. Conversely, if the test proves negative, then the patient
can unhesitatingly be declared dead. van Till, supra note 46, at 23.
61. van Till, supra note 46, at 23-24. The risks of an angiography are basically two-fold.
The technical procedure of administering the injection properly creates a risk, especially in
patients over 75, where the circumference of the arteries is generally diminished. In addition,
the radio-opaque substance itself could cause blood clotting as the arterial space could be
too narrow for its passage. Except for these conditions, the possibility of serious side effects
has been dismissed. Interview with Dr. Mel Greer, Chairman of the Department of Neurology at University of Florida Medical Center (April 4, 1979). See also ABRAMs, ANGIORAPHY

165-66 (2d ed. 1971); T. NOMURA, ATLAS OF CEREBRAL ANGIOGRAPHY 14-15 (Ist ed. 1970);
J. WHrmaY & T. WHrrLEY, ANGIOGRAPHY-TEcHNiqups & PROCEUDEs 16-18 (1st ed. 1971).

62. Interview with Dr. Mel Greer, Chairman of the Department of Neurology at University of Florida Medical Center (April 4, 1979); e.g., Quaknine et al., Laboratory Criteria of
Brain Death, 39 3. NEuRosuR. 429, 432-33 (1973) (findings that cerebral blood flow tests no
more exact than bedside tests such as an EEG). But see Pendl et al., Cerebrater Zirkulationssrillstandin korrellation mit EEG - und pO2 -APD Untersuchungen, 13 AcrA AMIOL.
329, 329-33 (1972) (study resulted in one patient showing ECS (electrocerebral silence - fiat
EEG but yet circulation was shown on an angiography); Miyazaki et al., Criteria of Cerebral
Death, 13 AcrA RADIOL. 318, 318-29 (1972). Their conclusions harshly criticized the EEG's
reliability. "The irreversible loss of function of the entire brain, including the brain stem,
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TraditionalCommon Law Death Concepts
Reflecting the medical criteria traditionally used to determine the time of
death, the common law deemed death conclusively presumed when cessation of
the vital functions of respiration and circulation had been diagnosed. 3 With
the use of artificial means of support, 64 such a determination is often impossible. Because artificial maintenance of circulatory and respiratory functions does
not necessarily mean continued functioning of the brain, the common law
cardiac-pulmonary definition of death is inappropriate in the artificial support
context. 65 The traditional definition cannot encompass the situations where
neurological activity has ceased, but other vital functions continue to be supported artificially.66 The time orientation demanded by the law requires know67
ing the moment death occurs.
However, the common law standard retains validity outside the artificial
support context. Commentators suggest that survivorship cases 68 indicate the
relative unreliability of the common law death standard.69 Believing that deaths
caused by head injuries can be diagnosed only by using the brain death standard, these critics have exaggerated the standard's benefits. Concededly, in circumstances involving decapitation, applying a death standard focusing on
heart-lung activity appears contrary to the dictates of common sense. Critics of
the common law standard understandably deride the Kentucky appellate court
decision of Gray v. Sawyer70 which held evidence of blood flow fifteen minutes
and thus the nonfilling of cerebral arteries in bilateral carotid and vertebral angiograms is an
absolute criterion for determination of brain death - ECS is only incidental." Id. at 320.
63. See note 2 supra.
64. Prior to artificial life-support systems, neurological activity ceased within 15-20 minutes
of cardiac-pulmonary arrest. See note 21 supra.
65. See note 3 supra.
66. It is not material that if the brain dies, other vital functions will cease within two
weeks even if artificially supported. Rubin, supra note 29, at 816. Under the common law
standard, the subject would be deemed alive for the two week period. See notes 2 & 30 supra.
67. The significance of precisely when death occurred can be viewed in a variety of legal
arenas. See note 19 supra.
68. Determining the time an individual dies is particularly critical to survivorship cases.
To whom the property will pass often depends solely on which spouse predeceased the other
in a tragedy where both were victims. The absurdity of calculating the precise differential was
exemplified in Estate of Rowley, 257 Cal. App. 2d 324, 65 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1967) where the
court found one spouse survived the other by 1/150,000 of a second. Id. However, the stakes
are enormous. Unless the trier of fact can be persuaded that one spouse outlived the other,
most states, through adoption of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (USDA), presume that
both spouses died simultaneously, and for inheritance purposes, each decedent is to be treated
as if he survived the other. See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE ON THE UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE, THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 209 (1973).
69. Friloux, supra note 4, at 12-17. Mr. Friloux blanketly states, "The traditional common
law determination of death and the time it occurs are fact questions for a jury. To say that
such a state of the law was acceptable or workable would be a distortion of reality." Id. at 13;
Comment, supra note 4, at 228-31 (treats the common law standard as generally defective
where death results from head injuries, but notes that courts cannot be expected to adopt a
new standard until a uniform set of brain death criteria are accepted).
70. 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1952).
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after decapitation was admissible. In Gray, the court applied the common law
death standard and stated that continuous blood flow presumed a functioning
heart, and therefore, life had not ceased.71

By stressing the nonsensical outcome of Gray, critics have grouped decapitation cases with cases involving deaths from more typical head injuries.72
An analysis of the latter, however, demonstrates that outside the artificial sup-

port context, only in rare situations will application of the traditional common
law standard be less reliable than the brain death standard.75
In In re Estate of Schmidt, 4 a California appellate court held that a hus-

band had predeceased his wife in a head-on collision solely because blood
flowed from the wife's ear 15-20 minutes after the initial impact. The court
ruled such evidence sufficient under the common law death standard to negate
the presumption of death at impact,7 thus convincing the court that she surM

71. Id. at 497, Accord, Vaegemast v. Hess, 203 Minn. 207, 280 N.W. 641 (1988) (death
occurs on cessation of the vital functions of xespiration and circulation); Thomas v.
Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950) (death occurs precisely when life ceases
and does not occur until the heart stops beating and respiration ends); cf. John v. Burns, 67
So. 2d 765, 767-68 (Fla. 1958) (time of death is a fact to be proved as any other and may be
established by circumstantial evidence).
72. Friloux, supra note 4, at 12-17; Comment, sup-a note 4, at 228-80.
73. A sample of cases where the time of death is the controlling issue and decapitation is
not a factor, reveals that had the courts applied the brain death standard, the analysis and the
outcome would have remained unchanged. See Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 871, 215
P.2d 478 (1950). In Thomas, an inheritance distribution case, the court affirmed a jury finding that according to the cardiac-pulmonary standard, one joint tenant had survived the other
by exhibiting signs of breathing longer. The same result is reached by applying the brain
death standard. Spontaneous breathing indicates brain stem activity, which precludes a finding of brain death. Therefore, even under the brain death standard, one joint tenant would
have legally survived the other. Similarly, severe head injuries coexisting with breathing
would affirm the existence of life under the brain death standard. See Smith v. Smith, 229
Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958). In Smith, the court, using the cardiac-pulmonary standard,
took judicial notice that a person breathing, though unconscious because of head injury, is
not dead. Id. at 583, 317 S.W.2d at 281. Again, the same outcome would have xesulted had a
brain death standard been available. Accord, In re Davenport's Estate, 79 Idaho 548, 323 P.2d
611 (1958); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Spain, 339 Ill. App. 476, 90 N.E.2d 256 (1950);
Scmitt v. Pierce, 844 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1961) (en banc); Taylor v. Cawood, 211 S.W. 47 (Mo.
1919); White v. Taylor, 155 Tex. 892, 286 S.W.2d 925 (1956).
There are other cases which demonstrate that the use of brain death standard would not
have improved the decision reached by the trier of fact because of insufficient evidence in determining the time of death. Speculation rather than approximation decided when death
occurred; e.g., Glover v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. 1963) (evidence daughter had died ten
minutes after car crash, but unable to determine if father had survived similar amount of
time); Evans v. Halterman, 31 Ohio App. 175, 165 N.E. 869 (1928) (husband and wife
murdered by same assailant, and both found dead).
Finally, in decapitation cases, only the brain death standard appears to be appropriate.
See, e.g., Savers v. Stolz, 121 Colo. 456, 218 P.2d 741 (1950). However, fact situations have
shown that even under these circumstances, the evidentiary problem of timing cannot be
underestimated. In Gogel's Adm'r v. Orth's Ex'r, 814 Ky. 591, 236 S.W.2d 460 (1950), medical
evidence was introduced indicating that although one spouse had been decapitated in a train
collision, "the impact probably killed both spouses] at the same time." Id. at 462.
74. 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1968).
75. Otherwise, the statutory presumption of simultaneous death would have arisen. See
note 68 supra.
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vived her husband by 15-20 minutes.7 In addition, the court found the wife's
death had resulted from a basal skull fracture77 which would not necessarily
justify an immediate death declaration under the brain death standard. Testimony by an eminent neurologist and neuropathologist in Schmidt revealed that
a patient suffering from basal skull fracture could maintain continuous brain
function for 19-24 minutes after the injury38
Had the Schmidt court used the brain death standard, the results might
have been the same. The wife's survival could have been upheld on the basis
of continuous brain non-function 19-24 minutes after the initial impact.79 Notwithstanding the precision in time the law requires, the common law standard
is adequate in pinpointing death outside the artificial support context. Furthermore, no definitive proof has been offered that under these circumstances the
brain death standard would improve upon the reliability of the common law. 0
JudicialAdoption of HarvardCriteria
Courts have generally adopted criteria similar to the Harvard criteria as
s
Without delving into the medical controversy,
accurate indices of brain death.B
for the usage of the Harvard criteria,82
support
legal
widespread
and following
76. 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 268, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847, 854.
77. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY ILLUsTRATED 555 (23d ed. 1977), a break in the base
of the cranium (skull) resulting from a trauma.
78. 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 265, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851.
79. Id.
80. See note 73 supra.
81. People v. Saldena, 47 Cal. App. 3d 954, 121 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1975); People v. Driver, 62
Ill. App. 3d 847, 379 N.E.2d 840 (1978); Commonwealth v. Golston, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh.
1778, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978), State v. Brown, 8 Ore. App.
72, 491 P.2d 1193 (1972). See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (in dictum, the
court recognized the Harvard criteria as an accurate diagnosis of brain death). Cf. New York
City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
Interpreting the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, the court ruled that "the generally accepted"
definition of death as "brain death" should be used. The lower court also held the definition
must be consistent with generally accepted medical practice. Id. at 1004, 367 N.Y.S.2d at
687-88. No cryptologist is needed to decipher the court's ruling as an endorsement of the
Harvard criteria.
But see Tucker's Adm'r v. Lower, No. 2831 (L. & Eq. Ct. of City of Richmond, Va., May
13, 1972). In Tucker, the trial judge sent both the common law and brain death definitions of
death to the jury for consideration; see also Lorato v. District Court, 601 P.2d 1072 (Col.
1979) (where the Supreme Court of Colorado adopted the Uniform Brain Death Act which
specifically notes that an absence of brain stem function is paramount to a declaration of
brain death).
82. See generally Byrn, Compulsory Life Saving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44
FoRD L. REV. 1 (1975); Compton, supra note 15, at 522; Friloux, supra note 4, at 10-19; Note,
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act -Death Construed by Court Consonant with Medical Standard
of Brain Death, 29 RUTG. L. REV. 485 (1976); Comment, But When Did He Die?: Tucker v.
Lower and the Brain Death Concept, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 424 (1975); Comment, Medical
and Legal Views of Death: Confrontation and Reconciliation, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J., 172 (1974):
Note, Legislation: The Need for a Current and Effective Statutory Definition of Death, 27
OKLA. L. REV. 729 (1974). But see Wasmuth, supra note 15, at 646, 651. See also Kushnir, supra
note 4, at 204-05 & nn.35-37 (outlining brain death criteria adopted by the World Medical
Association, and the Massachusetts General Hospital Brain Wave Laboratory). But see
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courts have consistently upheld application of the Harvard brain death standard. However, a dual acceptance of the criteria has appeared.
Cases involving homicidal deaths have, as a matter of law, upheld the use
of the Harvard criteria, thus increasing the criteria's legitimacy. Such criteria
preclude homicide defendants from raising as an affirmative defense83 that
medical conduct subsequent to the declaration of brain death proximately
caused the victim's death. To uphold the convictions, courts have taken
judicial notice, based on the Harvard criteria, that the victim was dead before
termination of a life support mechanism or removal of a vital organ.8 4 Conversely, the same criteria have been viewed with greater circumspection when
deciding liability claims against medical personnel. Under these circumstances,
the criteria have not been upheld as a matter of law.85 In essence, the legal
system has not applied brain death criteria consistently.
Criteria as Applied in Criminal Cases
In State v. Brown,s an Oregon appellate court held a gunshot wound to the
head and not withdrawal of artificial support caused the victim's death. In
finding the victim brain dead, the Brown court relied on the attending physician's testimony attributing death to brain stem damage.8 7 However, insufficient evidence was introduced demonstrating the absence of brain stem or
mid-brain activity. From the lack of neurological activity in 'the cortex, the

Dukeminier, Supplying Organs for Transplantation,68 MICH. L. REv. 811, 847 (1970); Kutner,
Due Process of Human Transplants: A Proposal, 24 U. MIAMI L. REv. 782, 804-05 (1970)

(suggests additional criteria including angiography might be necessary); Ford, Human Organ
Transplantation:Legal Aspects, 15 CATH. LAw. 136, 140-41 (1969) (xecognizes the lack of consensus concerning the adequacy of American brain death criteria); Wecht & Aranson, supra
note 42, at 488 (advocates support for Pittsburg criteria which are distinguishable from the
Harvard criteria in that emphasis is placed on the measurement of falling arterial pressure).
For views from other countries, see Stoop, Law in Australia, Relating to the Transplantation
of Organs from Cadavers, 48 Ausr. L.J. 21 (1974); Skegg, Irreversibly Comatose Individuals:
Alive or Dead?, 33 CAMB. L.J. 130 (1974); Hillman, Towards a Legal Definition of Death, 1972
SoL J. 323; Gravenor, Medicine and the Law: The Legal Definition of Death, 1971 Crrry's

L.J. 341.
83. This affirmative defense was first raised in England in 1963 in an unreported case,
commonly xeferred to as In re Potter.Adjudicated five years prior to the publication of the
Harvard Report, the court rejected defendant's plea that his conduct was not the proximate
cause of the victim's death. The court did not find the doctor, who had turned off the
respirator after the victim was deemed hopeless and his kidney removed, responsible for the
homicide. Rather, the court attributed the victim's death to his assailant. In re Potter, No. 55,
763, Tim TIMES, (London) 9 (weekly ed. July 26, 1963); 4 MEDICINE, ScIEcNC AND TfIm LAW 59
(1964).
84. See text accompanying notes 86-103 infra.
85. See text accompanying notes 104-115 infra.
86. 8 Or. App. 72, 491 P.2d 1193 (1972).
87. 8 Or. App. 72, 75, 491 P.2d 1193, 1194-95. No specific clinical evidence was
cited by the court supporting a diagnosis of brain death. Although the court charted the
course of the gunshot wound, noting the bullet "passed through both cerebral hemispheres,
both sides of the brain.., the skull on the other side .... " the court failed to mention the
criteria used to convince the physician to turn off the artifical respirator. Id.
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physician probably assumed an absence of activity in the brain stem. s Because
most medical scientists believe the brain stem controls respiration and can
function even in the absence of cortical activity,89 arguably the victim was not
brain dead prior to removal from the respirator. 90 The court, however, as a
matter of law upheld the American criteria as an accurate diagnosis of brain
death. 91
The California superior court decision in People v. Lyons92 further legitimized the Harvard criteria. In Lyons, the doctors declared the victim brain
dead two days after receiving a gunshot wound to the head. Heart transplant
surgery followed. Again, the American criteria were used to determine death.
Moreover, the court rejected the defendant's claim that the heart's removal
caused the victim's death and ruled as a matter of law that the victim died
prior to the transplant. 93
Although Brown and Lyons laid the foundation for legally sanctioning the
Harvard criteria, the supreme court decisions of People v. Saldena94 and Commonwealth v. Golston95 fully established the criteria's legal respectability. Both
courts were impelled to ignore the uncertainty of the criteria to uphold first
degree murder convictions. In Saldena, the California supreme court circumvented a state law96 prohibiting conviction for murder or manslaughter unless
the victim dies within three years and a day of the incident.97 By rejecting the
defendant's claim that termination of artificial support proximately caused the
victim's death, the California court upheld the validity of the brain death
criteria.9s Thus, evidence indicating the victim's heartbeat could have been
88. After performing an autopsy, the physician testified the "cause of death was a gunshot
wound of the head with resultant damage to the brain which resulted in damage to the vital
centers of the brain which control respiration and other body activities." Id. Assuming that
damage to the brain translates into damage to the cortex and damage to the area controlling
respiration signifies brain stem damage, the physician appears to have concluded that cortical
damage inexorably leads to total brain stem dysfunction. Although the Harvard criteria
appear premised on similar reasoning, studies have shown brain stem function can exist in
spite of cortical damage. Moreover, neurological activity in the brain stem could be present,
but insufficient to engender spontaneous respiration.
89. See note 55 supra.
90. The Brown court appears to have, unwittingly, endorsed the personhood concept. See
note 5 supra.
91. 8 Or. App. 72, 491 P.2d 1193.
92. [1974J 15 CRIM. L. RPTR. (BNA) 2240 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.).
93. The Lyons court ruled the victim dead before the heart transplant, but only after
taking testimony from an array of specialists including medical experts in the fields of
neurosurgery, cardiosurgery, and electroencephalogrophy. The court concluded, "not a scintilla
of evidence" indicated the victim was not dead prior to the heart transplant. Id. at 2241.
94. People v. Saldena, 47 Cal. App. 3d 954, 121 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1975).
95. Commonwealth v. Golston, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1778, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977).
96. CAL. PENAL CODE § 194 (1969). "To make the killing either murder or manslaughter,
it is requisite that the party die within three years and a day after the stroke received or the
cause of death administered .... " Id.
97. 47 Cal. App. 3d 954, 121 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1975).
98. In addition, the California court acknowledged the following definition of death: "a
failure of part of that organism to such that the total organism is no longer functioning in a
manner which a reasonable, intelligent person would xecognize as the purpose of that organism." Id. at 957, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 244. While this definition has been preempted by the
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sustained indefinitely with proper care was deemed not determinative. 99
Using analysis substantially similar to Saldena, the Massachusetts supreme
court in Commonwealth v. Golston, o0 discarded the common law rule pro-

hibiting a first degree murder conviction in cases where the victim survived a
specified time period.' 0' Basing its decision on the belief that physicians have
greater knowledge now than when the common law was established, the court
affirmed the Harvard criteria as sufficient to determine when death occurs for

purposes of the "law of homicide."12
These state court decisions have avoided examining the medical controversy
over the Harvard criteria. By uncritically permitting the Harvard criteria to
comprise the brain death standard, American courts have accepted such criteria
as accurate. 0 3 For purposes of the law of homicide, the Harvard criteria have

been sanctioned as unquestionably sound.
Criteria as Applied in Medical Personnel Cases
The Harvard criteria, although applied without hesitation in the homicide
context, have been cautiously applied in cases involving the liability of medical
personnel. Sensing the dimensions of the problem, Maryland's attorney general,
in In re Robaczynski,'0 4 recently decided to drop murder charges against a
nurse who unplugged the respirator of four comatose patients allegedly brain
dead. 05 In explaining the state's decision to drop charges, the attorney general

California brain death statute, such a definition has undertones of quality of life determinations. Once the question of death is left for the reasonable man to evaluate in light of "the
purpose of that organism," the door has opened to a broad range of subjective questioning. See
generally P. RAMSEY, ETrIcs AT THE EDGES OF LIEz (1978).

99. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 957, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
100. 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1778, 366 N.E.2d 744.
101. See Commonwealth v. Pinnick, 354 Mass. 13, 15 n.l, 234 N.E.2d 756, 757 n.1 (1968).
But cf. W. LA FAvE & A. ScoTt, SR., CRIMINAL LAw § 35, at 266 (1972). La Fave and Scott
contend the rule is outmoded. "The difficulty in proving that the blow caused the death after
so long an interval was obviously the basis for the rule. Now that doctors know infinitely
more, it seems strange that a year-and-a-day rule should survive to the present." Id.
102. 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1778, 366 N.E.2d at 744. The court's decision to ignore stare
decisis was obviously influenced by the brutal fact situation. An innocent pedestrian became
the victim of a relentless assault by a stranger with a baseball bat. Id.
103. See People v. Driver, 62 Ill. App. 3d 847, 848, 379 N.E.2d 840, 844 (1978). In Driver,
although the defendant appealed his murder conviction, neither the brain death criteria nor
the termination of artificial support following a brain death declaration were challenged on
appeal. Four days after the victim was assaulted, he showed no EEG reading. The next day,
a conference with the family was held, the respirator was disconnected, and the "victim expired." Id.
104. "Murder Charge Dropped for a Nurse in Maryland," N.Y. Times, March 30, 1979 at
A16, col. 6. The state attorney justified his actions on the "vagueness" of Maryland law. Yet,
Maryland had already passed a brain death statute which impliedly accepted the Harvard
criteria. The statute approves any diagnosis which is consistent "with ordinary standards of
medical practice in the community." See note 108 infra.
105. In return for the state not retrying the case, the nurse consented to forfeit her
license and agreed never to return to practice. "Murder Charge Dropped for a Nurse in
Maryland," N.Y. Times, March 30, 1979 at AI6, col. 6.
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partly blamed 'the vagueness of the Maryland law defining death," 10 6 and
hinted he would seek a revision.
The attorney general's explanation appears unsatisfactory. The Maryland
Brain Death Statute, 107 similar to all widely approved statutes, evaluates medical conduct against ordinary standards of medical practice.'0 s Unless that
standard is viewed as inherently unacceptable, challenging the Maryland statute
on vagueness grounds is unconvincing.1°9 The Harvard criteria would satisfy
Maryland's statutory requirements since the American medical community
accepts the criteria as valid indices of brain death. Therefore, the attorney
general need only know whether the comatose patients, based upon the Harvard
criteria, were alive prior to their removal from the respirator. Had the medical
records disclosed the patients were alive, then the nurse's conduct would have
proximately caused their deaths. 110
While the nurse in In re Robacyznski could have faced murder charges
under the Harvard criteria, medical personnel elsewhere have suffered due to
the courts' hesitancy to adopt such criteria. In Tucker's Administrator v.
Lower,"' the judge's refusal to fully sanction such criteria placed the defendant
surgeon in a precarious position. In Lower, a $100,000 wrongful death action
was filed by the brother of a heart transplant donor. The plaintiff alleged that
the heart had been removed prior to his brother's death. Consistent with standard medical practice, the physician had declared the donor brain dead and
mechanically maintained his vital functions during the operation."'1 In a decision that disappointed some," 3 the court denied a requested instruction that
only the brain death standard be applied and permitted the jury to consider
either the brain death or cardiac-pulmonary standard to support their findings. 1" By allowing jury deliberation with both standards, the judge acknowledged partial dissatisfaction with the Harvard criteria."15 Had the judge been
106. Id.
107. MD. [PUBLIC

HEALTH] CODE ANN. art. 43, § 54F (Cum. Supp. 1979).
108. The Maryland statute closely resembles the Kansas statute's definition approach to
brain death legislation. See notes 132-134 and accompanying text, infra.
109. A substantial body of law would be retired if the legal profession discarded traditional fictional generalizations such as current medical standards and reasonable men. For
insight into the functional aspects of these "glittering generalizations," see generally Weyrauch,
Law as Mask-Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 CAL. L. Rv. 699 (1978).
110. In comparing Robacyznski to a criminal case such as Golston, the actors' motives and
the actors themselves evidently affect the courts' decisions. However, to adopt different criteria
for determining death under similar environmental circumstances undermines the public's
expectations of consistency.
111. No. 2831 (L. & Eq. Ct. of City of Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972); Compton, supra
note 15, at 523.
112. No. 2831 (L. & Eq. Ct. of City of Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972).
113. Friloux, supra note 4, at 13; Note, But When Did He Die?, Tucker v. Lower and the
Brain Death Concept, 12 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 424, 428-32 (1975); Comment, Medical and Legal
Views of Death; Confrontation and Reconciliation, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 172, 183-84 (1974).
114. The jury returned a verdict for the surgeon. No. 2831 (L. & Eq. Ct. of City of
Richmond, Va., May 25. 1972).
115. Compton, supra note 15, at 543. The judge felt thwarted by the doctrine of stare
decisis which he declared, derived from "an apparently archaic or incomplete definition of
death...." Id. at 527. However, even though disturbed by the common law definition of
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convinced of the criteria's accuracy, the jury would not have been exposed to
the common law standard. Conversely, the judge did find enough merit in the
Harvard criteria not to exclude it.
Thus, the same Harvard critfria applied by the courts in determining when
death had occurred for purposes of homicide have been ignored or minimized
in cases involving death of patients taken off artificial support by medical
personnel. This uneven application of brain death criteria challenges not only
the criteria's legitimacy, but also the legal system generally. Whether medical
personnel or criminal defendants, adoption of a uniform standard should enhance distributive justice, and put all on notice as to death's definition.
LIMITATION OF CuRRENTLY UsE BRAIN DEATH CRITERIA

Notwithstanding the view of many medical experts that the brain death
criteria are sufficiently accurate, a recent survey! 16 conducted by the National'
Institute of Neurological Diseases and Strokes (NINDS), of ten medical centers
revealed the estimated margin of error in diagnosing brain death lies between
three and five percent 117 Although reviewers of the NINDS findings stressed
that socio-economic needs 18 dictate the use of brain death criteria,, they conceded "there is no foolproof method to determine with 100 percent accuracy
the occurrence of brain death."" 9
Unusual medical cases have supported the NINDS conclusions. In Birmingham, England, an apparently dead kidney donor began breathing spontaneously
as the surgeons were removing his kidney.12 0 While this case and other prema22

ture death declarations' 2' have been dismissed as "incidental human errors,

these blunders appear to have resulted from inadequate brain death criteria.323
death, the judge did not consider the question of brain death as a strictly medical issue. Id.

at 543.
116. The prospective study of brain death criteria commissioned by the National Institute
of Neurologic Diseases and Strokes (NINDS), found that although criteria developed in the
study could detect the occurrence of brain death with 100% accuracy, no more than 95-97%

accuracy could be ascribed to current medical techniques. See Goodman & Aung, supra note
36, at 480.
117. One American medical center in the survey did use angiography to test blood circulation. Id.
118.
119.
120.
criteria,
ceptivity

See note 56 supra.
Goodman & Aung, supra note 36, at 482.
According to the brain death criteria used, which were similar to the Harvard
the patient was dead at the time of surgery. Although no EEG was taken, unreand unresponsiveness along with pupillary mydriasis (fixed dilated pupils) were all

present. See van Till, supranote 1, at 800.
121.

In early 1975, a similar incident took place in a hospital in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

In addition, Israeli physicians have reported a number of unexplained revivals subsequent to
a clinical diagnosis of death. In one instance, a 15-year-old boy who had apparently
fulfilled the Harvard criteria was kept on the respirator and two weeks later completely recovered. See generally Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 J. AM. MED. A. 112 (1964).

122. van Till, supranote 1, at 809.
123. See notes 52 & 55 supra. See also Molinari, Clinical Criteria of Brain Death, in Brain
Death, supra note 1, at 68. The neurologist summarized his findings as follows: "[A]t this

point in the history of the art and science of medicine, the highest degree of assurance that
the brain is dead may be achieved in the shortest possible time, only by using multiple in-
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Thus, the Harvard brain death criteria may have an inherent unreliability
factor.124 In contrast, most cardiac-pulmonary criteria errors resulted from
human misjudgment 125 rather than unreliability inherent in the criteria.
Furthermore, the consequences of misdiagnosis are less serious when applying
the cardiac-pulmonary standard. If a physician has access to artificial support
mechanisms, he can supplant the cardiac-pulmonary functions. Misdiagnosis
of brain death, however, leaves no second chance because once the physician
pronounces brain death, post mortem procedures commence. 1 26
The inability of medical science to determine the full scope of lower brain
activity is another cause for concern with the brain death criteria.127 This gap

in medical knowledge, coupled with the Harvard criteria's inability to detect
the complete absence of brain activity and the impossibility of artificially supporting brain function, suggests the Harvard criteria are far less accurate indices
of death than the cardiac-pulmonary standard.
BRAIN DEATi STATUTES INDIRECTLY
LEGALIZING HARvARD CRITERIA

In light of the risks inherent in the Harvard criteria's application, and the

inconsistencies underlying judicial decisions in this area, 28 a statutory solution
should be considered. In addition, the rising number of cases filed against
physicians and nurses manifests the need for some guidelines in the artificial
support context. 29 Although the American Medical Association (AMA) op-

dependently measured variables including clinical criteria, electrophysiologic criteria (the
EEG), and assessment of cerebral circulation determined either directly or indirectly." Id. at
68. The Harvard criteria do not include an examination of cerebral circulation.
124. The failure of the Harvard criteria to address the number of potential causes of
apparent death also raises questions as to the criteria's reliability. Although the Harvard
Report recommended a full etiological study be undertaken to insure against hypothermia
and CNS depressants, it failed to mention other "apparent death" causes which would also
render the Harvard criteria unconclusive, e.g., asphyxia, electrocution, intoxication, accidental anesthesia, reflex inhibitions, etc. See Manuila, et al., DicrIONNAnta FRANCAISE DE MmICINE ErT
DE BIOLOGm 862 (1971), in van Till, supra note I, at 807.
125. See notes 23-26 supra.
126. Obviously, as science has not developed a mechanism to maintain neurological
function, a diagnosis of brain death will be treated as excluding the possibility of continued
neurological activity. Once declared brain dead, all legal protection is lost. See van Till, supra
note 1, at 792.
127. Some neurologists have assumed lower brain activity by itself is meaningless. These
neurologists equate cortical death with brain death, based on their belief that lower brain
activity alone has no integrating capacity to create pain sensation. See Veatch, supra note 5, at
310. This opinion is consistent with the failure of the Harvard criteria to satisfactorily
measure the existence of lower brain activity. See note 55 supra.
128. See notes 81-115 and accompanying text, supra.
129. "Murder Charges Dropped for a Nurse in Maryland," N.Y. Times, March 30, 1979,
A16, col. 6. See notes 104-115 and accompanying text, supra; see also Ford, Human Organ
Transplantation: Legal Aspects, 15 CATH. LAW. 136, 141 (1969). In his article, the former
Houston District Attorney expressed his fears that the confusion over when the respirator can
be shut off would increase the risks of liability of medical personnel. Id.
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poses such statutory efforts,130 brain death statutes 31 have implicitly incorporated the Harvard criteria in the absence of statutory language enumerating
specific brain death criteria. Each statute includes a provision permitting
physicians to diagnose brain death according to current medical standards.
The Harvard criteria constitute the current medical standard of brain death
diagnosis. Thus, the enactment of brain death legislation, in effect, has legalized

the Harvard criteria. s 2
The Kansas legislature, first to pass a brain death statute, enacted a statute
incorporating both the common law and brain death concepts. 33 The statute
has been criticized for creating the misconception that two phenomena of
death exist.' 34 A more reasonable interpretation would indicate the statute
merely legalizes two methods for detecting when death has occurred. s5 Where
130. See Compton, supra note 15, at 537-39.
131. See Issacs, supra note 5, at 7. Issacs groups the states which have passed brain death
statutes into three categories. Those following the alternatives definition approach are
Kansas, Maryland, Virginia, New Mexico, Oregon and Iowa. Iowa and Montana have adopted
the model statutes proposed by Professors Kass and Capron. The third approach, based on the
Law and Medicine Committee of ABA has been enacted by California, Georgia, Illinois,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Idaho. Finally, since Issacs published his article, North Carolina
has passed a convoluted mess, and the Uniform Brain Death Act has been formulated. The
North Carolina statute permits the physician to declare the "person" dead but gives the
family the authority to terminate artificial support. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Cum. Supp.
1977). The Uniform Brain Death Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1978. The Act reads as follows:
§ 1. [Brain Death]
For legal and medical purposes, an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation of
all functioning of the brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination under this
section must be made in accordance with reasonable medical standards.
In the analysis, the Commissioners aistinguish functioning from activity. The former suggests
a purposefulness while activity can be associated with "meaningless cellular processes." See
generally Uniform Brain Death Act (Supp. 1979).
132. Rarely have courts demonstrated a willingness to abandon a generally recognized
community standard. But see The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) where Judge
Learned Hand stated, in dicta: "a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of
new and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages.
Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even
their universaldisregardwill not excuse their omission." Id. (emphasis added).
133. KAr. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Cum. Supp. 1973) provides as follows: "Definition of death.
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a physician, based
on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and
cardiac function and ... attempts at resuscitation are considered hopeless... or
"A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a physician,
based on ordinary standards of medical practice . . . it appears that further attempts at
resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not succeed .

. .

. Death is to be pronounced

before artificial means of supporting respiratory and circulatory function are terminated and
before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation."
134. Capron : Kass, supra note 1, at 105-11. Basically, Capron and Kass fear that people
will believe there is one type of death in the artificial support context and another outside it.
Moreover, they dislike the statutory language which provides, in the transplant context, the
patient is to be deemed dead prior to termination of artificial support. According to this view,
there is no need to distinguish the transplant setting from any other.
155. See Compton, supra note 15, at 542. Compton disagrees with Kass and Capron and
believes simply using the expression "medically and legally dead" clarifies the ambiguity. Id.
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the absence of brain function does not reasonably appear to be reversible
based on ordinary standards, either the common law or brain death standard
can be applied to declare the patient dead.1 36
The second approach, enacted in a number of states,' 37 affirms the brain
death concept 38 but only as a last resort. 3 9 When death cannot be determined
using the traditional standard due to artificial support, the statute mandates
diagnosis of death based on "an irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain
function."' 140 Whether such a condition exists is ultimately determined by
"ordinary standards of medical practice."'14 The differences between this approach and the Kansas approach are superfluous since both rely on ordinary
standards of medical practice to measure the physician's conduct. Moreover,
neither statutory approach attempts to outline the criteria which comprise the
ordinary standard.
A third approach, taken in California, 42 incorporates a sweeping professional standard into the statute: the usual and customary standard of medical
practice. The statute defines brain death as "an irreversible cessation of total
brain function."' 43 Such language appears to require an attending physician to
4
report an absence of all neurological activity before declaring brain death.' "
136. See note 133 supra. However, a provision in the alternative brain death section expressly states that the patient is to be deemed dead prior to the termination of artificial support, if the continuation of such is needed for transplant purposes.
137. Professors Capron and Kass developed this proposal: "A person will be considered
dead if in the announced opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical
practice, he has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. In the event that artificial means of support preclude a determination that
these functions have ceased, a person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of
a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, he has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions. Death will have occurred at the time when the
relevant functions ceased." Capron & Kass, supra note 1, at 112.
138. Again, the enacted statutes speak only to the brain death concept. No statute which
incorporates specific brain death criteria has been passed in this country. See notes 5, 6 & 14
supra.
139. In effect, Capron and Kass have fully endorsed the traditional cardiac-pulmonary
standard except in those instances when heart/lung activity is maintained artificially. Capron
& Kass, supra note 1, at 111-17.
140. Id. at Ill.For a discussion of the term "spontaneous," see note 144 infra.
141. Capron & Kass, supra note 1, at 111.
142. The California statute was based on the recommendations of the American Bar
Association. CAL. DEATH CODE § 7180 (1974) provides that "[a] person shall be pronounced
dead if it is determined by a physician that the person has suffered a total and irreversible
cessation of brain function, and requires independent confirmation of the death by another
physician." Id.
In addition, it specifies that "nothing in the act shall prohibit a physician from using other
usual and customary procedures for determining death as the exclusive basis for pronouncing
a person dead." Id.
143. Id.
144. The theoretical implication of requiring a total absence of brain function is farreaching. "Total" signifies "complete" which suggests the statutory requirements could be
satisfied only by applying the most accurate brain death criteria. Otherwise, doubt as to the
absence of function in all parts of the brain- cortex, cerebellum, mid-brain, medulla and
brain stem- could not be erased. In contrast, "spontaneous" signifies an "immediate natural
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Therefore, objections to the use of the Harvard criteria should theoretically be
sustained because such criteria cannot conclusively determine the existence of
neurological activity in the brain's lower regions. However, as the usual and
customary medical practice is utilization of the Harvard criteria, a California
court would probably rule such criteria sufficient to establish brain death. 145
Under each of these brain death statutes, the Harvard criteria are legalized
despite their uncertainty. Protected by ordinary standards of medical practice,
physicians are not dissuaded from applying the Harvard criteria alone in determining brain death. In light of the risks inherent in sutch criteria, a more
satisfactory approach must be explored.
PRoPosED STATUTE AND EVALUATION
In spite of sentiment among American legal and medical commentators
against including brain death criteria in legislation,146 such an inclusion would
enhance accurate death diagnosis. While such criteria should comprise a substantial part of brain death diagnosis, compelling the patient to be diagnosed
by those criteria exclusively is unreasonable. To protect patient interests, without unduly hindering the physician, the following proposal requires patient
consent before a physician can diagnose brain death based solely on the
Harvard criteria. The proposal reads as follows:
For all legal purposes, a human body with irreversible cessation of total
brain function, complete and lasting absence of all neurological activity
in the cerebrum, the cerebellum, and the brain stem, shall be conclusively presumed dead.14 7 An irreversible cessation of total brain function
shall be recognized when the attending physician, according to ordinary

standards of medical practice, has diagnosed an irreversible cessation of
cardiac-pulmonary activity. If, however, such activity is artificially mainimpulse." See WEmsr's THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2204 (1961). Identifying that part
of the brain which controls "spontaneous" brain function and verifying its non-function according to "ordinary standards of medical practice" would meet the statutory requirement.
In actuality, the legal system has not drawn a distinction between an absence of spontaneous
and total brain function. By incorporating a vague medical standard, the statute blurs the
subtlety differentiating spontaneous from total brain dysfunction. Moreover, the Harvard
criteria (the usual and customary medical procedure) fail to distinguish between cessation of
spontaneous and total brain function. E.g., van Till, supra note 1, at 828.
145. There have been no reported decisions rendered under the California Brain Death

Statute.
146. See Capron & Kass, supra note 1, at 102-07; Wasmuth, supra note 15, at 650; Kennedy,
The Kansas Statute on Death - An Appraisal, 285 NEw ENG. J. MmD. 946, 946-47 (1971); Death
With Dignity:Hearingson S.83-683 Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 92nd Cong.
2d Sess. 86 (1972) (Dr. Beecher, Chairman of the Harvard Brain Death Committee, testified
that it was too early to "freeze" brain death in a statute). But cf. Dukeminier, supra note 81, at

847. Dukeminier has proposed incorporating into a brain death statute the brain death criteria
set forth by the Pittsburg Brain Death Committee. Id.
147. Much of this language closely parallels that found in the Norwegian brain death
regulations. Presently, the Norwegian regulations state: "The diagnosis of death is based on
the following definition: death has occurred when there is a total destruction of the brain,
with complete and lasting cessation of all functions in the cerebrum, the cerebellum, and the
brain stem. This definition is generally valid and covers all causes of death." See Veatch, supra
note 5, at 319.
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tained and through ordinary standards of medical practice, at least two
attending physicians have diagnosed an irreversibly comatose state, then
subject to the provisions of paragraph (B), satisfaction of one of the
following criteria shall irrebuttably presume death; (A) (1) a cessation
of all blood supply to the brain as demonstrated by four-vessel craniocerebral angiography; (2) a termination of all artificial support systems
followed by a confirmation period of at least 15 consecutive minutes;
(3) a diagnosis that the extracranial blood pressure has been zero, or less
than intracranial blood pressure or shock level for at least 15 consecutive
minutes.1 4 1 (B) If the comatose patient, during a cognitive state and

capable of fully understanding the nature of his actions had signed a
consent form 149 or a legal guardian signed a consent form,1so then the
diagnosis of an irreversibly comatose state, by at least two attending
physicians according to ordinary standards of medical practice, shall be
sufficient to treat the human body as dead.
Protection of Patient'sInterests
Without ignoring the medical community's legitimate interests, the proposal
distinguishes between a physician's discretion in treating a patient and a
patient's right to understand the treatment's consequences. 51 A recognition of
148. These criteria are adopted verbatim from Dr. van Till. See van Till, supra note 1, at
806.
149. This provision allows the individual to decide whether the Harvard criteria are
sufficiently accurate in diagnosing death. Critics will challenge the wisdom of permitting lay
people to partake in medical decision-making. See notes 162-168 and accompanying text, infra.
However, in light of the controversy over the Harvard criteria and the finality of a death
diagnosis, reasonableness would appear to dictate providing the patient an opportunity to
consent to treating a diagnosis of an irreversibly comatose state as a death pronouncement.
See app. In the absence of such consent, the proposed statute prescribes a set of brain
death criteria to be applied.
150. See app.
151. This distinction underlies the conflict in the application of the informed consent
doctrine. Protecting the patient's right to know and understand the choices available to him
and the risks involved in undertaking medical treatment, the informed consent doctrine has
undergone continuous change in American law. At common law, if the physician performed
an operation and then went beyond the scope of the original operation wthout the consent
of the patient, or someone authorized to speak for him, the physician was liable in damages
for battery or trespass upon the person. Hundley v. St. Francis Hosp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 800,
327 P.2d 131 (1958). But cf. Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956) (doctor
not held liable). Courts became increasingly hesitant to view informed consent within the
strict confines of the battery theory. Expert opinion as to the community standard of disclosure is not required, and the patient need merely establish a touching to prove a failure of
informed consent. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972); see
McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. RIv.
381, 424 (1957). See generally Note, Failure to Inform as Medical Malpractice, 23 VAlN,. L. REv.
754 (1970). Furthermore, under a count of battery, the physician could be liable for punitive
damages. Malpractice insurance often does not cover intentional torts. Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for the Action, 75 U. ILL. L. REv. 580, 593 (1975); Comment, Informed Consent
in Medical Malpractice,55 CAL. L. Rav. 1396, 1399-1400 n.18 (1967). As negligence became recognized as the standard to determine whether surgery had been performed in the absence of
informed consent, two separate standards of negligence developed: the objective and the subjective standards. The objective standard has focused on whether the medical community
generally would have chosen not to disclose the subject information. In Govin v. Hunter, 374
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that interest, coupled with the Harvard criteria's uncertainty underlies the need
for placing the burden of communication on the physician and the burden of
acceptance on the patient. 152 Transferring the decision-making power from
physician to patient appears wholly consistent with both the doctrine of informed consent,153 and the right of privacy evolving since Roe v. Wade.15 ' In
Roe, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a woman has ultimate control
over her body even during the first trimester of pregnancy.' 55 In comparison,
the proposed brain death statute extends the right of privacy only to the individual concerned. The patient is given the opportunity to decide whether the
degree of uncertainty surrounding the Harvard criteria is acceptable. Besides
reinforcing the state's interest in preserving life,1 s the proposal encourages apP.2d 421 (Wyom. 1962), a Wyoming court followed the objective test, and ruled that it was
unnecessary for a physician to warn a patient of the possibility of disfigurement from a veinstripping operation. Unable to prove that the surgeon departed from the conduct of other
competent surgeons under similar circumstances, the patient lost his case. Conversely, in
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), the court
specifically stated that "the duty to disclose must be measured by the patient's need and that
need is the information material to the decision." Similarly, in Barnette v. Potenza, 79 Misc.
2d 51, 55, 359 N.Y.S.2d 432, 436 (1974), the New York supreme court chose the subjective test
and focused on the needs and expectations of the patient. In Barnette, the court expressly
stated the "[s]tandards established by the Medical profession should not control." Id., 369
N.Y.S.2d at 436. The court further noted that the jury should have been instructed to determine what a prudent person in plaintiff's position should have decided after receiving adequate information of all the perils. Id. But see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW, art. 28, Hospitals,
§ 2805-d, Limitations of Medical Malpractice Based on Lack of Informed Consent (1975)
(McKinney).
This statute provides increased protection for the physician if he exercised "reasonable
discretion" in withholding the information from the patient. Id.
152. An unwarranted burden would be placed on the patient if he were to assume sole
responsibility for cognizance of the risks surrounding the Harvard criteria. A layman's explanation outlining potential risks and benefits would determine whether the patient's consent was, indeed, informed.
153.

See note 151 supra; see also N. HERsiHEY & S. BusHsoaF, INFORMED CONSENT STUDY

1-8 (1969).
154. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The right of privacy affirmed in the Roe decision can be traced
to the Supreme Court's language in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold,
the Court upheld the right of married people to have access to information, instruction and
medical advice regarding contraception. Justice Douglas, who delivered the opinion of the
Court, maintained that in the marriage relationship there is a "'right' of privacy older than
our political parties, older than our school system." Id. at 496. Subsequent to the Griswold
decision, the Court in Roe v. Wade affirmed the woman's right of privacy outside the marriage
context. "This right of privacy ...is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy." 410 U.S. at 153. Finally, in Danforth v. Planned
Parenthood, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Supreme Court fully recognized the woman's right of
privacy by holding that the state may not constitutionally require the consent of the spouse
as a condition for abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. See generally Heyman &
Barzclay, The Forest & the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U.L. Rav. 765 (1973);
Comment, Right to Privacy - Spousal Consent to Abortion: Foreshadowingthe Fall of Parental

Consent, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 841 (1975).

155. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
156. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 4 Mass. Adv. Sh.
2461, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). Western tradition
and ethics have unequivocally given priority to the needs of the living donor over those of the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

plication of the most accurate brain death criteria.157
On a practical level, people may be increasingly reluctant to donate their
organs upon death if they believe such operations could occur before they are
actually dead. The belief that medical science cannot guarantee the donor will
not suffer pain once declared brain dead may be sufficient to frighten off potential donors.158

Ramifications for the MedicalProfession
An increasing number of suits filed against physicians have arisen over timing in the removal of organs for transplant. 59 Publicity of these suits could
result in fewer transplants and a lower quality of organs transplanted. With a
legally endorsed set of criteria, however, the likelihood of medical personnel
facing criminal or civil liability will be substantially reduced.160 This proposal
can better insulate medical personnel from liability than statutes without brain
death criteria. Reliance will no longer hinge on the nebulous gauge of ordinary
standards of medical practice. While the latter guarantees flexibility, it does

donee. Therefore, unless otherwise consented to, only the most accurate criteria in predicting
brain death should be used despite an increased risk of transplanting kidneys of lesser quality.
If the society decides the time is appropriate to place the needs of a kidney donee over that
of a kidney donor and the risk in the Harvard criteria should be accepted, then such criteria
should be fully endorsed. See van Till, supra note I, at 793-98, 814. In addition, van Till
argues the individual must be assumed to desire to continue living. "This leads us to accept
as a general ethical and legal rule that a physician has to try to keep his patient alive, i.e. to
delay his patient's death. In the case of unconscious patients, small children, and the mentally
disturbed, i.e. patients who cannot express legally valid views on the subject, it must also be
presumed that as a rule they want to go on living; hence, here too the physician is generally
obliged to delay their death." Id. at 796. But see Wasserman, Problematical Aspects of
Phenomenon of Death, 14 WORLD Ma. J. 147, 148 (1967). Wasserman contends the physician's
responsibility includes preparation of the patient for death rather than hopelessly fighting
death on behalf of the patient.
157. The threat of legal action will be present. Assuming the statutory criteria to have a
prima facie effect, the physician who does not apply the criteria without the patient's consent
would carry the burden of persuasion. The physician's only escape from legal liability would
be convincing the court that the criteria he used were no less accurate than that mentioned in
the statute. See K. HuGcHs, 1 FLORIDA EVIDENCE MANUAL ch. 4 (1978).
158. Minimizing the legitimate fears of kidney donors, however, must be examined in the
context of medical evidence disclosing that the quality of the transplanted kidney is a function
of its blood circulation. The chances for a successful transplant are enhanced by decreasing
the period of time between cessation of blood circulation through the kidney and its removal.
Unfortunately, the probable effect of the proposed statute will be to increase that time period.
Those donors diagnosed as brain dead according to the criteria outlined in the proposed
statute, could conceivably lack blood circulation in the kidney for an additional 10-15 cirtical
minutes. However, an angiography showing an absence of intracranial blood flow would
permit the continuation of artificial support. The "human body" would be conclusively brain
dead. But see note 62 supra.
159. See notes 104-115 and accompanying text, supra.
160. The criteria would place the medical profession on notice as to which applied
criteria would not impose potential liability. Having a specific set of criteria to follow would
clarify the physician's legal burden. To vindicate himself, the physician must demonstrate
merely that he adhered to the use of the statutory criteria.
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not necessarily increase legal protection.1 61 Having specific criteria, however,
will provide the physician with notice as to when he is risking legal liability.
Notwithstanding the benefit of minimizing the risks of liability, many in the
medical community will view such a proposal as an unwarranted invasion of a
previously exclusive medical realm.1 62 The AMA has resisted the notion, that
those outside the medical area should participate in decisions concerning brain
death criteria.163 Jealously guarding what it considers an exclusive medical
prerogative, 64 the AMA has denounced efforts to legislate brain death criteria.
Fearing that such provisions would eventually erode the medical prerogative,
the AMA has refused to support such statutes.165 Medical commentators have

161. The nurse in In re Robacyznski and the surgeon in Tucker's Adm'r v. Lower became
victims of a broad professional standard. Although not criminally prosecuted, the nurse did
sacrifice her profession. The surgeon in Lower narrowly avoided substantial monetary and
reputational damages. Had there been statutory criteria, in all probability no legal action
would have been necessary in either case. Both individuals would have been aware of the
prescribed brain death criteria and the potential for legal action in the event such criteria
were ignored.
162. A close parallel may be drawn to the informed consent doctrine. Protecting the
patient's xight to reasonable disclosure of the consequences of medical treatment has
per uaded some courts to focus on the needs of patients rather than general medical practice.
Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971) (knowledge a particular
patient may need to make an informed choice "bears no inherent relationship" to customary
medical practice); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972) (noting reasonable
disclosures depend on the circumstances of the particular case and therefore other physicians'
conduct is immaterial; see also note 151 supra. This shift in focus toward specific patients
encourages greater physician sensitivity to fulfilling the obligations imposed by the informed
consent doctrine, because ultimately, physicians can no longer rely on general standards of
medical practice. As a result, patients increase their participation in the decision-making
process, and notions of medical exclusivity fade.
163. Provocative commentaries have been written about the role of medical education in
limiting a physician's awareness of the non-medical issues involved in a particular problem.
These commentators have blamed the "need for speed in medical-decision making" as a
primary factor. Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 CoLuM. L. REv. 620, 633 (1969); see generally Powers, InterprofessionalEducation and the Reduction of Medico-Legal Tension, 17
J. oF LEGAL EDuC. 167 (1965); Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag:
Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation,15 U.C.L.A. L. R.v. 357 (1968).
164. Compton, supra note 15, at 537-39.
165. To comprehend the zealousness of the AMA's stand, all brain death statutes previously proposed or enacted approve nothing more than the brain death concept. No attempt
has been made by legislators to evaluate the appropriate standards, as most American legal
proponents have concurred that such standards should lie in the exclusive province of the
medical community. But see Kutner, Due Process of Human Transplants,24 U. MiAMi L. REv.
782 (1970). Kutner discusses the approach taken by the AMA to brain death. Id. at 790. Originally, the AMA issued a set of guidelines defining death, which included a flat EEG, cessation
of breathing without mechanical assistance, failing blood pressure, lack of reflexes, and dilation
and fixation of pupils. The AMA later modified this initial statement and adopted the broad
professional standard. "The cause of death must be evident and irreversible. The fact of
death must be established and must be demonstrated by adequate, current and acceptable
scientific evidence in the opinion of the physician making the determination." Id. at 791.
Also see Judicial Council, Ethical Guidelines For Organ Transplantation,205 J. Am. MED. A.
341 (1968).
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supported this position by characterizing brain death criteria problems as being
strictly medical.16
However, the Ad Hoc Committees which recommend brain death criteria to
American medical centers have been represented by at least one theologian and
one lawyer, along with physicians.167 Had the issue been distinctly medical, it
is hardly likely that outsiders would have participated. Furthermore, this
proposal's threat to the medical community may be more apparent than real.
Even with a proposal delineating the meaning of brain death and incorporating specific brain death criteria, physicians can circumvent the statutory
language. The proposal does not preclude introducing compliance with the
Harvard criteria as evidence of brain death.1 68 However, the proposal does encourage physicians to follow the criteria, if for no other reason than to minimize potential legal liability.
CONCLUSION

The brain death criteria prevalent in America today fail to detect the most
rudimentary brain function. The legal community must confront the uncertainty surrounding the Harvard criteria, whether the consequences be increased
premature death declarations, eventual diminution of kidney donors, or increased liability for medical personnel.
Unless death is defined as the state in which comatose patients can no longer
meet the Harvard criteria, such criteria should not receive unqualified endorsement. As such criteria cannot conclusively detect total brain death, to continue
applying the Harvard criteria as if foolproof is unacceptable. Critics of brain
death statutes incorporating specific criteria, however, will consider such statutes
as denigrating the societal interest in upholding the integrity of the medical

166. Most American medical and legal commentators share the views held by the AMA on
this particular issue. The Ad Hoc Committee on Brain Death of the University of Minnesota
recently denied the uncertainty of their criteria and recommended permitting physicians to
discuss only the conceptual meaning of brain death with the comatose patient's family. Rejecting the claim that brain death criteria pose a quantifiable risk, the Minnesota Committee

urged limiting the brain death discussion for those outside the medical field. Implying that
the brain death problem for non-medical critics centers on ways to broaden public acceptance,
the Committee concluded that "[The brain death problem] is a dilemma that the physician
will continue to face until the brain death concept has been more fully recognized by the

public." Cranford, supra note 36, at 600-01 (1978); see generally BRAIN DEATH:
MEDICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES

(J.

INTEELATED

Korein, ed, 1978).

167. The Pittsburg, Minnesota and Harvard Brain Death Committees are not strictly
represented by medical personnel. Theologians, historians and lawyers have also participated
in the decisions reached. For example, the Pittsburg Brain Death Committee has included 14
medical specialists (surgeons, internists, psychiatrists, neurologists, a pathologist, an anesthesiologist, the Allegheny County Coroner, and the President of the Allegheny Medical Association),
three theologians, a county judge, a law school dean and a county bar association president.
Wecht & Aranson, supra note 42, at 492 n.10.
168. The criteria set forth in the proposal establish an irrebuttable presumption of brain
death. However, a physician deciding not to follow the statutory criteria could defeat its prima
facie effect by introducing sufficient evidence upholding the validity of the Harvard criteria.
See K. HuGsS, supra note 157, at 8-12 (1978).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol32/iss2/4

32

Rothstein: The Citadel for the Human Cadaver: The Harvard Brain Death Criter
1980]

HARVARD BRAIN DEATH CRITERIA

profession. 169 That view is untenable in light of the uncertainty inhering in the
Harvard criteria. The brain death proposal is not designed to stifle the medical
profession. Rather, the proposal attempts to insure public understanding of the
limitations in the diagnosis of brain death and permit the individual patient to
weigh the potential consequences of the medical uncertainty surrounding the
Harvard criteria.
PAUL

S.

RoTHsTEIN

APPENDIX
, hereby consent to being treated as dead if at
(B)(1) I, the undersigned,
least two attending physicians diagnose my condition according to ordinary standards of
medical practice as an irreversibly comatose state. I recognize that this consent form does not
affect my status as a kidney donor. However, if I have chosen to be a kidney donor, I am fully
aware of the benefits and risks of having a kidney transplanted when diagnosed as brain dead
without the use of angiography or a fifteen minute waiting period after termination of my
life support system.
Dated:

City and State
Signature of individual

Witness
Witness
hereby
, legal guardian for
(11)(2) I, the undersigned,
, who has been declared legally incompetent, treated as
consent to having
condition as an irreversibly comadead if at least two attending physicians diagnose
tose state according to ordinary standards of medical practice. I recognize that this consent
as a kidney donor. However, if I have decided, after
form does not affect the status of
should be a kidney donor, my decision was made with full
careful deliberation, that __
awareness of the benefits and risks of having a kidney transplanted when diagnosed as brain
dead without the use of angiography or a fifteen minute waiting period after termination of
life support system.
_
Dated:
City and State
Guardian
Witness
Witness

169. That interest has been recognized in a number of cases. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter,
362 So. 2d 160 (4th D.C.A. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 4 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2461, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 31 F.2d
I000, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

33

